Dialectical Cognition

The Regulation of Action in its Form of Reproduction of Self-Necessity by thought

Juan Iñigo Carrera

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Published by CICP

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CICP
CENTRO para la INVESTIGACION
como CRITICA PRACTICA
Casilla de Correo 5417
1000 Correo Central
Buenos Aires
Argentina

ISBN 950-798-001-6
Translated by
Juan Iñigo Carrera and Delia Palenque
Translation revised by Pablo Arengo

Original title: El conocimiento dialéctico/La regulación de la acción en su forma de reproducción de la propia necesidad por el pensamiento (ISBN 950-798-001-6)

Queda hecho el depósito que marca la ley 11.723
Impreso en Argentina/Printed in Argentina

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Presentation

As soon as we observe the development of social struggles during recent years, we cannot but notice the particular evolution suffered by the space available today for scientifically directed action towards the radical transformation of our present society into a consciously regulated one. We are referring to, in other words, the conscious revolutionary action whose aim is the supersession of capitalism into socialism or communism.

Even the most conspicuous worshippers of ideological forms, the philosophers, today are rejoicing in proclaiming to the four winds, *the end of ideology*. It is about the "exhaustion of utopian energies", Habermas says; of the "decline of the grand narratives of emancipation and progress" Lyotard stresses. After this, there is nothing left for them but to embrace the ragged post-modern consolation of inconsequential smallness, which is such that not even they themselves find satisfactory to cover the public nakedness of their own vacuity.

Let us consider those who personify the capital that is wholly collective property within its national ambit -and therefore, as much capital for the whole of the proletariat, and as much private capital for the proletariat of the rest of the national ambits, as any other. Urged by the crisis in the accumulation process of this capital, they see themselves increasingly forced to break up their ideological mask of representatives of the absolute negation of capitalism; that is to say, of socialism or communism. They are only fit now to resort to democratic apologetics to cover the real limits of the social process that they incarnate: the alienation of human potencies as capital potencies.

The late discovery of the ideological nature of *Marxism* (in other words, of the representation, and therefore degeneration, of the ideal reproduction of the specific forms of today's society, advanced by Marx, as a conception of the world, a system of thought) decimates the ranks of its old partisans. Some of them abandon it just to keep themselves fashionable, post-modern in

the present-day; but others, to affirm their necessity to personify the genuine transformation of capitalism into a superior social form.

Then, if there is anything that these concrete forms of social struggle suffice for by themselves, it is to make evident the substantial enlargement of the space that presently corresponds to conscious revolutionary action. What can express with more eloquence the advance of the social necessity to develop this action, but the recognition, precisely from the field of ideological alienation itself, of the mere ideological character of the conceptions with which capital attempts to empty the action in question of its true contents. In the entire history of capitalism, the social demand for conscious revolutionary action has hardly manifested itself with more clarity and energy than is apparent today.

We can very well say, then, that the necessity of human action based on scientific cognition imposes itself more than ever. And, indeed, as soon as we turn to look at this form of action, we see it manifesting itself in its own potency, revolutionizing again and again the material conditions of social production; developing in this revolutionizing society's material productive forces; projecting these forces beyond the point where they can take form in the capitalist regulation of the social metabolism process.

But as soon as we face scientific cognition in itself, insofar as it is abstractly such, the view changes completely. Popper's self-complacent whining has the last word: "although we can never rationally justify our theories, ... we can at least discuss them rationally". Against such bluntness nothing arises but Feyerabend's degraded "everything goes"; if not the mere declamatory reaffirmation of the possibility of verification of theories in practice; a declaration that has nothing but its emphasis to conceal the impossibility of its logical foundation. Or, reaching the very limit of the degradation of scientific cognition, the pathetic holding up of its opposite, abstract fantasy, to its true essence; that is, the affirmation of the heuristic character of theories. Scientific practice thus ends up being scientifically turned into a sort of "he says that I say that he says", able to flow indefinitely without holding in itself more content of reality than this tittle-tattle itself. Hermeneutics: such is the password with which the *scientific community* gives way to this mass of hollow words that

it expects will be taken as a sign of scientific vitality. Nor is it just a question of gossips concluding one day that they have practiced science all their life without being aware of it.

Such circumstance should not surprise anybody: with an acceptance nowadays that cannot be more universal, scientific cognition manifests itself, having the construction of theories about real concatenations as its natural necessary form. It manifests itself thus, in general, representing these real concatenations, that is to say, determination -i.e., the affirming of itself by means of self negation, contradiction- by the relations of measure of real concrete forms, based on *formal logic*. But it also does so, representing determination by the interpenetrating, by the antagonism (simple or *over-determined*), by the *relative autonomy*, of opposites, based on a more or less specified *dialectical logic*. Strictly followed, the method itself of this form of scientific cognition, of theoretical cognition, makes evident by itself the irreducible externality of its product, the ideal representation of real concatenations, with respect to their necessity. And, with this evidence, the evidence of the equally irreducible externality between scientific theoretical cognition and scientific cognition's own generic aim; aim which is the regulation of the real appropriation of matter, the regulation of action, under the form of ideal appropriation of the necessity of matter.

With the careless arrogance needed to judge the more or less five thousand million years that human life potentially has ahead on earth (not to go any further in this computation) from the narrow viewpoint of those whom are the product of just the first three million years of human history, scientists themselves hurry now to declare the impossibility of the ideal reproduction of reality, of the reproduction of reality by thought, to the point that taking for granted the ideological determination of all scientific cognition is currently seen as the most unquestionable historically conscious criticism of its present general form. And scientists themselves are the ones who consequently condemn scientific knowledge for all eternity and with no extenuation as that which corresponds to its alleged innate limitation, to the field of *exhausted utopias*, of *emancipating grand narratives*. Even the most blatant apologetic cretinism of capitalism has nothing else to ask for: from the lips of its true representatives, the very same scientific method declares that we have reached the *end of its*

history, and that *the future is already here*. If one had Orwell's expressive strength, we could very well say that when one looks from scientist to ideologist, and from ideologist to scientist, it already is impossible to say which is which.

Certainly, the current stress on the deterioration of ideology's image and the reach of science is not completely alien to the contemporary development of the crisis of general overproduction. The immediate advance towards it, and particularly this crisis itself, normally takes concrete form in the decay of apologetic optimism; just as the increase of the tension within scientific cognition that sees itself in this way unavoidably faced with its own limits. However, once the bases of the process of capital accumulation are renewed through crisis, ideological optimism reappears and one's own limitations are condemned to the field of bad and better forgotten memories. In that which corresponds to this reappearance, the double loss of faith is then neither new nor lasting.

But the magnitude of the current emptiness, put into evidence by this double self-declaration of bankruptcy, serves for itself and beyond this circumstance, as expression of the degree of maturity reached by the necessity of a radical transformation of the method of scientific cognition itself. Yet, this self-declaration is nothing but a pale expression of the necessity, in this same sense, positively manifested by the today's development of the conscious regulation of the social metabolism process, and even by the development itself of the material conditions of this process; positive manifestation that only emerges, however, in the advance of the reproduction of these developments by thought.

It is really a question of the development of capital's necessity to annihilate itself into a superior social form: the conscious regulation of the social metabolism process, i.e., into communism or socialism. It is thus specifically about *capital's development into conscious revolutionary action*; and, therefore, about the development of the organicity itself of the revolutionary action of the proletariat; about the development of scientific cognition as the necessary concrete form of radical political action.

Certainly, critical scientific theory takes this question as its own aim. But, even in its versions that like to present themselves as the most radical ones, scientific theory is not able to go further than clashing against a string of apparent contradictions. Thus, it has

already become commonplace to go around in circles regarding the essential concrete forms of the organicity of the revolutionary action of the proletariat, to end up pretending that the problem is solved just because it is given an ingenious name:

- the economic structure of society determines the political, ideological superstructure, from this, the proletariat's consciousness and, therefore, revolutionary action; that is, the necessary determination of the radical change of economic structure. Invoking the supremacy of the structure as *the determinant in the last instance*, the *relative autonomy* of the superstructure, the *over-determination* of this *dialectic*, etc., has no substance other than as a means to skirt the issue.

- capitalism carries in itself the necessity of self-annihilating into socialism, but there is no possibility for socialism other than through the proletariat's voluntary action. There is no way to discover the true relationship between necessity and freedom by representing it as the external dialectics of *willfulness* and *fatalism*, of *activism* and *passivity*, of being *revolutionary*, *reformist* or *conformist*.

- general theories arrive at the formulation of certain necessary laws, but anyone that has to deal with everyday practical matters knows that there is an abyss between these two. As frequent and wordy as they are, the justifications of the link between *the theoretical model*, *the theoretical framework* and *the concrete practice* cannot do more than resemble what Marx referred to as the dialectics of "on the one hand ..., on the other hand ...".

- scientific cognition is a class product, but ideology is the absolute negation of scientific cognition. To appeal to *the superiority of proletarian science*, to *the genius of its founding fathers*, to its *historical verification*, is nothing else but affirming the most genuinely ideological product of capital: that ideology necessarily takes the form of scientific method itself.

- scientific cognition appears nowadays having the formulation of theories as its natural form; but it is impossible to demonstrate that theories are true or false prior to action; and even afterwards, although it really makes little difference at such point. Therefore, scientific theories are only ways of *interpreting* the world and, as such, the very negation of conscious action. Socialism is the consciously regulated human social metabolism process, that is to say, the social metabolism process that is scientifically regulated.

Consequently, as much as scientific cognition is condemned to interpretation, so is socialism condemned to impossibility. In fact, critical scientific theory has not conjured up a name to be liberated from this disgrace: it is uncritical enough not to notice the apparent contradiction involved here.

These apparently thorny questions are clearly present in the very evident crisis of theoretical cognition that sees itself as critical, in particular for Marxism. But they are equally present in the current crisis of scientific method in general. Such poverty of scientific theory is by itself sufficient to show that these apparently insoluble enigmas do not concern this or that theory, but scientific theory in itself. And that the critique of today's existing science does not take the form of the construction of a new theory, but in the overcoming of scientific theory itself. Therefore, it is not about conceiving a new *representation of reality*, condemned by its sole condition of representation to respond to a constructive necessity alien to the real necessity, i.e., a logic. The point is *to virtually appropriate reality by reproducing its necessity through thought*, the *ideal reproduction of reality*.

It is not scientific cognition, the concrete form that the conscious regulation of the human social metabolism process takes, that faces the end of its history. It is rather scientific theory, the historically specific form of that cognition when it is developed as alienated potency in the human social metabolism process autonomously regulated by means of the production of value: just as scientific theory is born where commodity production's domination cleared the way early on, capital's advance towards its self-annihilation in the conscious regulation of the human social metabolism process already shows in the present-day, the necessity of the cessation of scientific theory as the general form of the appropriation of reality by thought.

The development of scientific cognition as regulation of the transformation of our present society into the one of freely associated individuals is, therefore, *the critique of scientific theory*. I face the generic development of the organicity of the proletariat's conscious revolutionary action, unfolding its necessity in the following way:

Capital's development into conscious revolutionary action
Critique of scientific theory

I. *Dialectical cognition*

I. Dialectical cognition; i.e., the regulation of action under its form of reproduction of self-necessity by thought: from the immediateness of action to the determination of its concrete subject (the development of the necessity into its concrete form of freedom), the concrete forms of the ideal reproduction of reality (the method of dialectical cognition).

II. Mathematical cognition; i.e., the cognition of the measure of self-necessity: the determination that negates itself as such (the affirmation by means of the negation of self-negation) and the lack of a real necessity whose development is to be reproduced ideally; the concrete form of measuring the magnitude of quantum, i.e., the mathematical process of cognition: from the representation of quantity relations as abstractly such (logic) to the representation of the measure of real abstract forms by the relations of measure of their concrete forms.

III. Critical history of the forms of mathematical representation; i.e., the development of mathematics as a formally historic process in itself: the emptying of the specificity of quantitative determination in formal logic; the reintroduction of quantitative determination as abstract extensiveness; the mutilation of the logical development of the relation between the unit and the multiplicity until they reach their identity in the number, with the following inversion of the representation of this development as mathematical analysis, abstract algebra and topological relations.

II. *The historical determination of dialectical cognition*

IV. The development of matter into generic human being: the determination of matter as general historical development, i.e., as universe; life: the regulation of the individual metabolism process, the regulation of the simple social metabolism process, from animal specificity to generic human being.

V. The development of generic human being into capital; i.e., the alienation of human potencies as capital's potencies: the general regulation of the social metabolism process by means of the ideal appropriation of reality; the autonomous regulation system of social metabolism process; the conscious regulation of social

metabolism process.
VI. Consciousness as capital's potency; i.e., alienated consciousness: the development of the commodity into mutual individual independence as a form of social interdependence; the individual concrete form of social regulation; the incompatibility of capital with dialectical cognition as the general form of scientific cognition.
VII. The science of capital insofar as it is purely determined by the appropriation of surplus-value; i.e., the resolution of the contradiction between capital's necessity to submit all production and consumption to science and capital's necessity of alienated consciousness: the theoretical representation of reality by the relations of measure of real concrete forms; ideology in the form of scientific cognition method.
VIII. Marxism; i.e., the degradation of ideal reproduction of reality, in view of the advance of this reproduction developed by Marx, to a conception of the world, a system of thought: its concrete manifestations in the reduction of the general conscious regulation of the social metabolism process -socialism or communism- into its specific opposite, capitalist autonomous regulation (and, therefore, the elevation of capitalism to an eternal social form): the cases of the reduction of determination and of its cognition to externality, of the problem of the transformation of value into price of production, of the abolition of private property within a national process of capital accumulation.

III. *Scientific cognition as necessary concrete form of revolutionary action*
IX. The realization of concrete political action: the political organization of the proletariat and the unfolding of scientific cognition.

I am presently working on the development of what is briefly laid out here. However, the exposition of the forms of dialectical cognition as specifically such, already suffices by itself as a spearhead for the necessarily collective work in which the ideal reproduction of our real necessity takes shape; at the present time, the conscious regulation of the radical transformation of society. Hence, the decision to publish the first chapter of the whole work separately. Such a decision implies taking the risk

arising from the partial character of this first chapter, and, above all, at the expense of the necessity of preceding it by this presentation, unavoidably exterior to the reproduction by thought of the real determinations involved.

Juan B. Iñigo Carrera

Buenos Aires, October 1991

Dialectical cognition*; i.e., the regulation of action in its form of reproduction of self-necessity by thought

1. What is it to be done

"The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to *change* it."[1] We place ourselves, from the very beginning and beyond any doubt, in the field of action, of practice.

It is in this field that our first step lies in answering ourselves about our action's concrete form. About, what is it to be done[2].

* The Spanish word *conocimiento* means both the process of appropriating reality by thought and the result of this process. At the same time, it is the term commonly used concerning the scientific procedure of that appropriation: *conocimiento científico*. On the contrary, the English word normally used, *knowledge*, refers directly to the result of such appropriation, keeping almost no traces, if any, of the other meaning; which in Spanish is *saber*. We cannot unfold at this point the historical necessity of this reductionism that tends to conceive the appropriation of reality by thought not as a process, as human action in itself, but only as a crystallized result. To overcome this reduction, we are going to use the not so common term cognition, which maintains the twofold meaning.

[1] Marx, Karl, 11th. Thesis on Feuerbach. "Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden *interpretiert*; es kömmt drauf an, sie zu *verändern*." *Thesen über Feuerbach*, Marx/Engels Ausgewählte Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, Vol. I, p. 200. (The translations from German were made in cooperation with Carlos Lehmacher).

[2] Yes, indeed, to whose action could we be referring to at this stage, but to the one that is our own in the immediateness of our singularity as concrete subjects. To mine, to the action of the reader that has begun

Our transforming action tells us, thus, just by imposing this first step upon us, that it is not simply itself; that it is itself and at the same time a different thing: the very question of *what is it to be*

right here to critically reproduce the exposed development by him/herself. The unfolding of the necessity of our own action has not shown us, up to now, another reason for this action, not being the fact itself of having set us in motion. The necessity of our action must, from this, its own immediateness, unfold then its own reason; that is to say, the determination of our singularity as concrete subjects. And, in this way, to come to account for that immediateness itself. We can see right away, that this unfolding is not fit anyway for starting, with no further ado, with the usual interpretative ponderous chatter about the unity between theory and practice, about the revolutionary subject, about the subject in general or any other such topic; ponderous chatter that any self-respecting academic will surely miss; and without which, the incurable superficial thinker who believes seeing in our necessity of action nothing else but an abstractly compulsive impulse, will surely show up. But not less alien to the immediateness where we find ourselves than such brainy interpretations, is the pretension to develop the criticism of these interpretations in this same place. Rather, everything that the existence of such interpretations already allows us to say is that, just as the necessity of our action must account for itself in its own unfolding, that necessity must equally account for, in this same unfolding, the reason why it does not present before us the necessity to dive in any of the mentioned representations that are typical; and consequently the necessity of our action must account for the necessity itself of these representations. "If I was willing at this point to *cut off beforehand* all considerations of that kind [[the considerations specifically in question, arising because there is not an immediate unfolding of the transformation of value into price of production, overlooking that such unfolding presupposes the unfolding of the determinations inherent to the capital circulation process]], I would spoil the whole dialectical method of development. On the contrary. This method has the good quality of constantly *setting traps* for these guys [the narrow-minded ones and vulgar economists], inciting them to the inopportune manifestation of their stupidity." "Wollte ich nun alle derartigen Bedenken *vorweg abschneiden*, so würde ich die ganze dialektische Entwicklungsmethode verderben. Umgekehrt, Diese Methode hat das Gute, daß sie den Kerls [der Spießers und Vulgärökonom] beständig *Fallen stellt*, die sie zur unzeitigen Manifestation ihrer Eselei provozieren." Marx, Karl. Letter to F. Engels of July 27, 1867. Marx/Engels Werke, Vol. 31, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1965, p. 313. [original text interpolated J.I.C.]; [[added clarification J.I.C.]].

done. It makes us know that, therefore, it carries in itself a determination that does not reduce to it itself. And this is the most our transforming action can tell us about itself in its immediateness, though we may face it and interrogate it once and again.

To continue forward with the realization of our action as an action whose regulation pertains to us, as a conscious action, there is nothing left for us but to confront the *what is it to be done* itself. In doing so, the *what is it to be done* shows itself no less elusive, in its abstract immediateness, than our action in the one that is its own. It shows itself to us in such immediateness, as it itself on a par with an other, the necessity of our action. After which, the *what is it to be done* has nothing to add about itself, not being through what this necessity of our action can tell us regarding itself. Let us face ourselves, then, with the necessity of our action. This necessity can only point out to us that our transforming will is the other one that it carries in itself; the other one where its own necessity resides. But our transforming will cannot tell us, concerning its own necessity, but rather it is only fitting for us to search for this necessity in that which our transforming will has of the proletariat's own transforming will. When we face the proletariat's will, it cannot give us immediate reason about itself, either. Rather, it answers us that, being that its reason is the one that interests us, we must start searching for this reason in its interior; in its condition of simple class will. But the clash against the absence of immediateness with respect to self-necessity repeats itself: classes limit themselves to tell us that we must look for theirs, first of all, in what they carry in themselves of the reproduction of the capital accumulation process.

Let us stop for a moment at this point in the development of our transforming action. Up till now, our action has materialized in the search of the necessity of its concrete forms. As such, it has come to tell us that it carries in itself, the transforming will of the proletariat. But it has equally come to tell us, that the will of the proletariat is not self-sufficient to account for its own necessity, that this necessity transcends it; with which, our transforming action has told us that, just as the transformation of the world takes in itself the proletariat's voluntary action, neither the concrete forms -and therefore, the proletariat's political organization -, nor the transforming potency of this action, are

simply born from the said will itself.

If we want to go on advancing in the realization of our conscious action there is, thus, no other way left for us now but to confront the reproduction of the capital accumulation process. But, concerning its own necessity, this reproduction does nothing but to point us back to its content of the valorization process of capital. When we face this, it shows itself, insofar as simple value valorization process, enclosing simple value production process, simple commodity production process. Production that persists in placing us in front of the production of the social link between independent private producers in a autonomously regulated social metabolism system. When we question this system about its own necessity it answers that we must start searching for it in its condition of human social metabolism process, of human life. But human life is not able to display its own necessity either. It demands, first of all, that we should go back to that which it has of the metabolism process as such, of the simply natural metabolism process. When we do so, this process presents us with its own necessity enclosed in its being precisely that, a simple process; that is to say, in its being simple determined existence. Determined existence that, in its turn, forces us, to answer in regards to its necessity, to confront that which it carries in itself of pure existence; of matter as abstractly such.

In searching for the necessity of our own action, at the risk of mutilating such consciousness, we have seen ourselves thus obliged to advance facing particular manifestations of reality by means of our thought. Each of these manifestations could not tell us about itself, but that it is itself and at the same time some other self that it carries within; and, therefore, that if what we are interested in is its necessity, we have no other place to start looking for it than in this other self. The course of our advance has only been able, thus, to go back analytically into the interior of our starting point throughout the connections so defined. Such has been its own necessity. But following this procedure upon reaching matter as pure existence and confronting it, we do not find that it contains in its interior one other self in which its necessity takes root. As simply such, matter shows us, thus, that our transforming action of society embodies it -matter- as its simplest content. In other words, that such action is a material form. But it shows us, at the same time, that our consciousness, as simple consciousness of

such abstract materiality that has come to be up to now, is still unable to account for the necessity of even the most general of the concrete forms with which we can carry out our action. Having exhausted our possibility for this analytical deepening, we are still far from completing our first step in the field of action in full cognition of cause. Nevertheless, such exhaustion is the only way open for us that does not carry in itself the immediate annihilation of this first step. And, we can certainly say, the unfolding of half of it.

As abstractly such, matter does not limit itself to show us that it does not carry in itself one other self from which its necessity arises. Moreover, it makes evident this simplicity of its own precisely because it shows us that it is, by itself and not by an other self, the necessity of negating itself as simply such abstract existence to affirm itself as concrete existence. That which matter tells us directly in its pure simplicity, is that it is immediate necessity, affirming itself by means of its own negation, of determining itself; that it is *becoming*. And it tells us so, realizing this necessity that is its own before us: pure existence becomes determined existence; that existence that we had left behind searching for the necessity of its being. On reappearing in this way in front of us now, determined existence does so with this necessity of its own already unfolded; that is to say, it does so as concrete form under which the abstract form realizes its own necessity. We find ourselves, then, in the presence of the unfolding of the corresponding moment of the necessity of our action. Nothing remains for us but to appropriate this moment in its virtuality, reproducing it by means of our thought[3].

Far from interrupting itself because of reaching matter in its absolute simplicity, as this is pure becoming, the flowing of our

[3] However much we sharpen our analytical capacity, matter refuses to open for it a path to the interior of its simplicity of pure existence. It does nothing but to send us back, in its own negation as simply such to affirm itself by itself as becoming. It takes care, so, of pointing out to us *the being* and *the nothing* as the pure mental abstractions that they are; and, consequently, as completely alien to the cognition of the most simple real abstractions. Which, far from condemning them to indifference, sets us on the trail of the necessity of such abstractions in the field of the ideological forms of the representation of reality.

course finds itself renewed. When we now face simply differentiated matter whose emergence we have just witnessed, it tells us that, insofar as it is realized necessity, it is the concrete form of simple matter. To add immediately, with the eloquence that is given to it by the fact that it transcends itself into an other different self in front of us, that, precisely as such concrete form, it is not the annihilation of the becoming, but necessity, itself, of determining itself by itself. It tells us in this way that it is, because of being concrete form of the becoming, necessity of affirming itself by means of its own negation; and as such, abstract form itself. Nature of concrete forms of matter, that each of them will be entrusted with making it evident to us, realizing it for us as soon as we reach it accompanying the development of the necessity of the immediately more abstract form from which it springs.

As soon as matter unfolds its pure necessity of determining itself as differentiated matter, this determination of its own takes concrete form in the affirming of the becoming itself by means of its own negation as simply such. In the development of this affirmation, the form whose necessity is realized becomes one other that, whereas having such necessity as realized inside itself, it has it as necessity to be realized that is its own. Insofar as it is abstract form, this form does not realize any more its own necessity simply by coming out of itself for determining itself as concrete form. It has this necessity of its own transformed into necessity of reproducing itself as abstract form. Insofar as concrete form, it takes in itself its own necessity of developing (becoming), as a condition of its own existence. Matter presents itself to us, thus, determining itself as living matter; and, consequently, the necessity of our action, unfolding that which it has of purely natural metabolism process. Thus, it is not trivial what matter tells us in respect to our necessity itself to account for the necessity of our action: the advancing in the appropriation of the specific virtuality of the medium is, by itself, the development of the capacity of the social subject to regulate its metabolism process. But, not because of that, matter falls short to tell us, with equal strength, how far we still find ourselves from fulfilling such necessity. No sooner than we reach matter under its concrete form of purely natural metabolism process, this form shows to us in its necessary unrest as abstract form. It happens that this process

transcends from being simply such, affirming itself as generic capacity of developing itself through the production of its medium; that is, through transforming the medium from alien to one for itself, by submitting it to its own labouring capacity. Purely natural metabolism process realizes, thus, its necessity by transforming itself in human social metabolism process. Hence, all the necessity of our action determined by that process, is so determined under the concrete form that is this one's own.

Human social metabolism process goes into motion by itself in our presence. It does so developing itself in its potency for really appropriating the medium beyond the reach of its actual capacity to regulate such appropriation on the basis of the appropriation of its own virtuality. That is, carrying the cooperation among its members beyond their capacity to -mutually recognizing each other in the development of their respective individual metabolism processes- directly coordinate these processes as moments of the social metabolism process. The process in question appears to us, thus, determining itself as autonomously regulated human social metabolism process. The process in which society assigns its total labouring capacity among the different concrete labour modalities by representing the abstract labour embodied in the products of the concrete labours carried out by the independent private producers, as the capacity of these products to relate among themselves in exchange. That is, where the general social relation of the metabolism process that produces its own medium becomes commodity; and abstract labour, in that way represented, becomes the value of commodities. The commodity is now the one who carries us forward in search of the necessity of our action. It does so as it goes on presenting us with its own development as the concrete unit of its natural form, use value, and its specific social form, its value form. In this development, the exchangeability of commodities negates itself as simply such, to affirm itself as direct exchangeability only of the commodity that all of them detach as their general equivalent, of money. And, therefore, commodity production presents itself realizing its necessity by taking as its general object the production of this general representative of value, the production of the general social relation in its concrete manifestation.

Social production as value production transcends itself,

realizing its necessity in the valorization of value itself, in the production of more value by means of value itself; in the transforming of money into capital. The production of capital starts thus to unfold itself before us in the purchasing of labour power (the commodity whose specific use value lies in its capacity to produce value) by its value. This is continued through the productive consumption of labour power beyond the necessary time for its own production. To end up with the sale of the commodities in which that consumption embodies itself, for their value; return to the money form that yields the corresponding surplus-value with respect to the capital originally thrown into circulation. As accumulation of means of production and means of subsistence for the labourers that presents itself to open its productive metamorphosis, capital tells us how it submits living labour to its necessity of self-valorization. To the point of determining as productive, no longer the labour that transforms the medium into means for itself, not even the one that produces value, but only the labour that produces surplus-value. Thus capital throws in our face, that it, materialized labour and, as such, means of human social metabolism process, has taken possession of the generic potentialities of this process. After which capital adds that, whether they like such an alienation of their generically human potencies or not, the bourgeoisie and proletariat cannot but personify these potencies which now belong to capital itself. As capital is itself the one that produces and reproduces human beings giving them the concrete form of bourgeoisie and proletariat, it goes on by realizing its necessity of simple valorization process transcending into reproduction of this process. Capital rubs in our nose, in this manner, the evidence that, whatever our necessity to act by radically transforming the world is, this necessity belongs to it, to capital, just as much as any other capital potency. Such necessity cannot be but necessary concrete form of its existence, however much the realization of this necessity is the one of its annihilation.

The simple reproduction of capital advances in the determination of itself, transfiguring itself into an extended scale of capital production, into the capital accumulation process. Relative surplus-value (The increase of the rate of surplus value by means of the reduction of the labour time necessary to produce labour power) negates itself with this, in its simplicity, to

affirm itself as general concrete form of this process. As such, its simple form (the increase of the productive capacity of labour in the spheres that directly or indirectly produce the means of subsistence for wage-labourers) becomes a double determination to the transcendence of the process of capital accumulation from simply itself. Double determination with which it joins the race for the circumstantial increment of the individual rate of surplus-value in the spheres alien to the indicated production. Such increment has, as its general form, the same one that the increment of relative surplus-value has as its concrete form: the circumstantial increment of the productive capacity of the labour that each capital puts individually in action over the social one.

Above all, the reproduction of the increment of the productive capacity of labour has, as its general concrete form, the increasing concentration of capital masses individually put into action. Necessity that clashes against private property of capital. And not just with particularly restricted forms of this property, but with it in itself. In its development, that necessity carries in itself the negation of the property in question as necessary concrete form of capital accumulation, causing it to affirm itself as an absolute limit to this accumulation. At the same time, the reproduction of the increase of the productive capacity of labour has, as its equally general concrete form, the submitting of all aspects of production to science; the reproduction of the simple increase of relative surplus value, the same submitting concerning consumption. From which, exhibiting itself before us in the developing of its general necessity as accumulation process, capital, our specific social relation, tells us that it takes in itself the necessity of annihilating its historical concrete base, as well as its historical reason of existence. Private property in general, as well as the insufficiency of the development of human capacity to appropriate its own social metabolism process in the integrity of its virtuality, i.e., to consciously regulate it. But, being capital itself the one who shows us such necessity, it tells us, in a no less forceful manner, how far it is from having transcended in such annihilation still. Capital tells us, thus, that it carries in itself this annihilation as a potency; and, more specifically still, as a potency that, just as it advances in its realization with the development of capital accumulation, it renews itself with this development as such potency.

As it advances in the concentration of the scale of individual capital and the scientific organization of production and consumption, the capital accumulation process manifests itself overcoming the narrow base of private property, already in what this directly personifies in the bourgeoisie, the general organization of the said process. Capital thereby deprives the bourgeoisie of its historical *right* to exist. At the same time that it determines the very proletariat from whose surplus-labour it feeds itself, with the mediation of developing it as collective labourer, as such general personification of its own. Personification that does not enclose any more in itself any limitation to its condition as such. And that it is, therefore, the most genuine concrete form of the process of capital accumulation. It is thus the proletariat who has in itself the necessity of personifying the annihilation of capital. This annihilation is, in itself, that of social classes. It is the annihilation of the bourgeoisie, straightway; no wonder why the bourgeoisie resists with tooth and nail. But, in this same annihilation, the proletariat realizes its own necessity, negating itself absolutely as such, certainly, to affirm its potencies as human potencies of freely associated individuals; that is to say, of the concrete subjects of consciously regulated human social metabolism process. No matter how alienated in capital this revolutionary potency may be, or better stated, precisely for being such alienated potency, it shows itself thus as the proletariat's own potency. And, as the point is the general organization of the process of capital accumulation, the production of the present general social relation, as potency that has the political revolutionary action of the proletariat as its general concrete form. What is it to be done but to realize it?

At last, we have unfolded in front of us the specific necessity of our action. This action can recognize itself as the necessary concrete form of existence of matter[4]. Specifically, of capital

[4] "The concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of multiple determinations, therefore, the unity of diversity. It appears in thought then, as a process of synthesis, as a result, not as a point of departure, although it is the true point of departure, and, therefore, as well, the point of departure of intuition and of representation. In the first path [the analysis], the sheer representation was condensed to abstract determination; in the second one, abstract determinations lead to the

potencies that carry in themselves the necessity of capital to affirm itself by means of its own negation, under a form that does not reproduce it anymore as a species[5]. Namely, of annihilating itself in a superior social form: the conscious control of social metabolism process, i.e., socialism or communism[6].

2. The concrete subject of action; necessity's development until it reaches its concrete form of freedom

In pursuit of the necessity of our action, we have found ourselves forced to move along a broad variety of real forms. We have had to go back analytically, from that necessity, to proletariat; from proletariat, to social classes; from social classes, to capital; from capital, to money; from money, to commodity; from commodity, to human social metabolism process; from this, to simple living matter; from here, to determined matter in general. We leave this determined matter behind, then, to deal with simple existence. Movement with which we have done

reproduction of the concrete by the path of thought." "Das Konkrete ist konkret, weil es die Zusammenfassung vieler Bestimmungen ist, also Einheit des Mannigfaltigen. Im Denken erscheint es daher als Prozeß der Zusammenfassung, als Resultat, nicht als Ausgangspunkt, obgleich es der wirkliche Ausgangspunkt und daher auch der Ausgangspunkt der Anschauung und der Vorstellung ist. Im ersten Weg wurde die volle Vorstellung zu abstrakter Bestimmung verflüchtigt; im zweiten führen die abstrakten Bestimmungen zur Reproduktion des Konkreten im Weg des Denkens." Marx, Karl Manuscript edited as *Einleitung [zu der "Grundrissen der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie"]*, Marx/Engels Ausgewählte Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, Vol. II, p. 486.

[5] "Capital is the economic power wholly dominant of bourgeois society. It must constitute the departing point as much as the ending point, ..." "Das Kapital ist die alles beherrschende ökonomische Macht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Es muß Ausgangspunkt wie Endpunkt bilden ... werden." Marx, Karl Manuscript edited as *Einleitung ...*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 493.

[6] From here on, in referring to consciously regulated social metabolism process, we will use these two generic names interchangeably.

nothing but to renew the unrest of transition, in the inverse reappearance and overcoming of each of those same forms as they unfold their particular necessity. However, no matter how absolute such a displacement may seem, we have not moved even one iota from our original object. Not in any of its moments, has the ideal reproduction of our real necessity gone through any determination that was not placed in the interior of revolutionary action in full cognition of cause. The firmness of our restriction to it is clearly evident due to the very form of the transition in which this maintenance in itself takes form.

When we analytically face the real form cut out by our immediate perception, it presents to us as being it itself at the same time as being one other self: its own necessity of existence. It presents to us, thus, as concrete form that is such because it carries in itself its own abstract form. Necessity of existence of a real form, this abstract form can neither be more nor less real than its concrete one. In its pure reality, one and the other only differ between them by the modality in which they carry in themselves the same real necessity. The real necessity that the abstract one has as potency that specifies it as such, the concrete one has as actual necessity that correspondingly specifies it. Abstract form's real potentiality is real actuality in the concrete form. The second form is the unfolded reality of the first one; the first one realized. Potency already developed into act, abstract forms only confront our immediate perception transfigured into concrete forms. In its turn, such perception finds itself completely limited to the exteriority itself of its object. It can scarcely come to cognize its object in the immediateness of its actual reality; actuality that includes, of course, the necessity that lies in it as potentiality to be realized. And what is there to say about our appropriation of abstract forms, no longer in the virtuality of their reality, but in their reality itself. Such appropriation gets hold of the abstract forms only in what, of these abstract forms, has the concrete forms that it transforms in itself. It is abstract forms' own reality the one that makes these forms acquirable by us, insofar as purely such abstract forms, only ideally[7].

[7] *All things are full of gods*, Thales the Milesian. The particular relationship between real abstract forms and the modality of human appropriation of them as such, is the fulcrum of every representation of

Upon discovering by means of analysis the necessity of existence of the form cut out by our immediate perception we

the nature itself of these real abstract forms as opposed to the *materiality* of their concrete forms, as a pure *immateriality*. From this inversion it necessarily follows (given that the necessity of concrete forms truthfully lies in the abstract forms of them) the *immaterial* nature of the determination of real concrete forms. And it equally follows that the realization of abstract forms is the transforming of them from *immaterial* ones into *material* ones. Such representation is historically necessary incarnation of alienated regulation of the human social metabolism process. Meanwhile (corresponding to the development of this alienated regulation) human cognition barely reaches the abstract forms of the concrete real ones most immediate to them, the representation we are dealing with takes shape in primitive animism. In this, each real concrete form presents itself enclosing an *immaterial* form that determines it, by its immediateness, in its singularity at first, insofar as species afterwards. Inasmuch as that specifically alienated regulation extends its generic base -ideal appropriation of real forms-, the representation of the nature of real abstract forms as *immaterial* develops into religious forms that embrace determinations of matter increasingly universal. It proceeds so, from pantheism to local monotheism, and then to universal monotheism. Where it comes to embrace with purely religious specificity, as Christianity, the unicity in the diversity of the determination of concrete forms. But even before this, what starts to emerge is the consciousness that the ideality of the appropriation process of the abstract forms as such is the underlying one in the conception of the *immateriality* of these forms. Timidly at the beginning, inverted in its own inversion, posing ideas as the representatives, the existence form, of that *immateriality*. Up until the idealist inversion reaches its irreducible simplicity in Hegel's hands: Hegel puts the ideal reproduction of reality, that is, the material form of the process of entire appropriation of abstract forms as such, in the place of the materiality of these forms, as the very *immateriality* of them. Thereafter, idealist philosophy has nothing new left to say; it has reached the end of its own development. An end that, even in its very form, carries in itself its immediate overcoming in the reproduction of reality by thought; and, with this reproduction, the end of philosophy itself as form of development of social consciousness. Idealist philosophy can only reach its end, thus, when it is no longer enough for the regulation of the social metabolism process to take form in alienated consciousness, and it needs to start doing so as free consciousness. But clearly the thing is not simply throwing philosophy to the dustbin: with the convenient professorial retreat, it is still in condition to render capital excellent services as plain ideology.

have not passed, then, neither really nor ideally, from that form to another external to it. Nor to a supposed one -i.e., ideally introduced- by us; so alien to the real form we face as much as anyone. What we have done has been to ideally penetrate into the interior of the real form in question. Penetration deepened afterwards, as many times as the abstract form consequently discovered, has shown to us enclosing in its interior its own necessity of existence as a pure potency; that is to say, enclosing in its interior another form of our real object, even more abstract than itself. This is carried out until we run into an abstract form of our real object that does not take in itself its own necessity of existence as potency to be realized, as abstract form that belongs to it. On the contrary, it is simple necessity of determining itself, of transcending from itself affirming itself in its own negation. This simple real form has, thus, the necessity of its own existence as immediately actual necessity; it is existence in itself. But, insofar as this actual existence of its own is necessity of transcending from itself, such simple form is, at the same time, potential existence. Potency that it realizes becoming concrete form; that is, realization of the contradiction, of the negation of itself to affirm itself, virtually immanent to it. Affirmation of the simple form by means of its negation as such, the concrete form is the real reproduction of the necessity of self-affirming by means of self-negation. And as such it unfolds in the development of forms increasingly concrete of our real object. As we follow this real movement with our thought, we have not left our concrete object's most abstract form for others alien to it, but we have ideally reproduced the metamorphosis in which this abstract form unfolds its necessity. We have followed in this way our real object in the integrity of the extension of its own development. We have followed it, then, up to where it has its concrete actual existence, no longer as realized necessity, but as necessity to be realized. We have ideally appropriated, thus, the necessity of its potencies insofar as real concrete object. And it precisely is the realization of these potencies that is in question. Our object shows itself, thus, in the fullness of what it truly is: a *subject.*

Matter is *the* subject. Subject that has, as it simplest form of existence, the affirming itself by means of its own negation, the

becoming, the necessity of determining itself[8]. Along its unfolding, this necessity manifests itself as the one that in each subject's concrete form has its full actual existence only as a power to be. As the potency that each of these forms carries in itself. And, therefore, as the concrete form of the necessity that determines them, concrete forms, as abstract forms. Abstract forms that, in their turn, affirm themselves by negating themselves: they realize their potency becoming concrete forms.

Under its simplest modality, the necessity carried by the

[8] Maybe it is already scandalous to those who conceive the representation of reality by its relations of measure as the exclusive form of scientific cognition, that matter has not presented to us its smallest micro differences, i.e., subatomic particles, as its simplest form. But these particles are not only concrete forms of specific determinations of matter. The cognition of their measure, and even the cognition of them themselves, is in itself alien to the general unfolding of the necessity of our conscious transforming action of social organization. And it is so, even though their cognition by means of the representation of their measure relations is nowadays the general condition for the realization of the production social process as simple material process. Moreover -with necessity that we shall see in its due time- the overcoming, by this last form of cognition, of the limitations to which it is subjected by its condition of representation (that is, its transformation into ideal reproduction of its object), presupposes the development of that unfolding. "[By] ... the *atomistic principle* ..., in reducing the infinite multiplicity of the universe to this simple opposition [*here* atoms and *next to them* emptiness] and by daring to recognize that one by means of this one, ...[[to which is added]] the equally trivial and exterior relationship of *composition*, that still must come to reach the appearance of a concrete and of a multiplicity, ... physics suffers in the molecules, particles, as much as political science, that departs from the sole will of individuals, does." "[An] ... das *atomistische Prinzip* ..., die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit der Welt auf diesen einfachen Gegensatz [sich *hier* Atome und *daneben* das Leere] zurückführt um sie aus ihm zu erkennen sich erkühnt, ... [[...]] das gleich triviale und äußerliche Verhältnis der *Zusammensetzung*, das noch hinzukommen muß, um zum Scheine eines Konkreten und einer Mannigfaltigkeit zu gelangen, ... leidet die Physik in den Molekülen, Partikeln ebensosehr als die Staatswissenschaft, die von dem einzelnen Willen der Individuen ausgeht." Hegel, G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 1969, Vol. V, B. I, pp. 184-186. [original text changed in its order J.I.C.]; [[added links J.I.C.]].

abstract form is an immediately realizable potency. But this simple modality affirms itself by means of its own negation in the enclosing, the abstract form, potencies whose realized forms are mutually exclusive in the same concrete subject; potencies that exist together with their contraries, determining the same abstract form as such. This abstract form carries in itself the necessity of taking a determined concrete form as well as the one that opposes this one. The potencies in question are not found any longer, in this abstract form, as a simple power to be. They are there as a power to be that is, at the same time, a power not to be; as possibility or contingency. The abstract form necessary develops itself, now, not in one concrete form, but in a diversity of them: some are the realization of some of its potencies, others, of other potencies. This continues until all the potencies that it keeps in its interior open the way for themselves. Abstract forms negate themselves, in this manner, as simply such, affirming themselves as genus. Its corresponding concrete forms do the same thing, metamorphosing themselves into the differentiated species in which the realization of the necessity of the genus takes form.

As the species is already realized possibility, the determination of its own possibility is, first of all, completely alien to it. From its point of view, the realization of necessity -causality- takes the form of casualness, of accidentalness. Of the necessity that, at the same time, is no necessity whatsoever[9]. At the same time that, negation of negation, each species, considered in itself, presents itself as the absolute materialization of those of the generic potencies that have particularly determined it[10]; and these

[9] From this unilateral point of view, the reduction of casualness to its appearance, abstract accidentalness emptied of all determination, feeds itself. Such a reduction is particularly tempting for the representation of real abstract forms by the relations of measure of their concrete forms, which needs to believe in the lack of all necessity immanent to its objects.

[10] This appearance provides the basis for the belief in immediate determination as the unique concrete form of existence of necessity; i.e., determinist metaphysics. From which it follows that, where necessity confronts us as possibility or contingency -and correspondingly as casualness or accidentalness- there is nothing but an insufficient cognition of its determination. To such a conception it all comes down to

potencies present themselves as the circumstances or conditions of the respective species. But the determination of the realization of possibility develops, in its turn, negating itself as alien - therefore casually and apparently immediate- in respect to the specific concrete form. It does so affirming itself in the determination, by this form, of its own necessity as concrete modality of the realization of possibility. That is, as concrete form that takes possession of its own conditions and transforms them, by itself, into concrete existences; as *life*. Such concrete form is, thus, necessary form of existence of other concrete forms of matter that until then, have faced it as potencies alien to it. It has, consequently, the generic form of transforming action that regulates itself. Action that advances in its real appropriation of the conditions that determine it, by previously taking possession of these conditions in their very virtuality. That is to say, recognizing itself as necessary form of realization of the possibility at stake: by virtually appropriating the forms whose possibilities it is capable of being the carrier of, such action can afterwards really appropriate these forms, imposing itself as concrete form of their necessity of transforming themselves. From subjects external to it, the action we refer to transfigures them in this way into its objects. This is, then, the transforming action which cognizes its own necessity.

Where the transforming action which cognizes its own necessity takes form, its subject starts by facing its own object as that which is truly for itself at that moment: something external to it as such subject. Hence, under its simplest form, cognition reaches the necessity of the subject's own-action just insofar as

representing the abstract form by its concrete form already developed, overlooking the transformation that mediates between them. In this transformation, the necessity that finds itself fully determined as possibility becomes realized possibility; that is to say, a power to be or not to be that has denied itself as such to affirm itself as simply determined being. This happens either as purely qualitative development or as quantitative development (temporal being a typical case). "God does not play dice": in this way Einstein has summarized the so inescapable as well as anguishing self-debating of scientific cognition centered on the representation of reality by its relations of measure, between this metaphysics and its apparent opposite, the one of abstract accidentalness.

this one virtually manifests itself as immediate link between the mutual necessity of subject and object. Consequently, such form of cognition does not go beyond the very exteriority of its object. It is determined, thus, as immediate cognition. Cognition, that because of its reach, is not capable by itself of recognizing itself as such. This immediate cognition transcends itself developing into the virtual appropriation of the necessity that goes back, in the unfolding of this necessity, beyond its immediate manifestation. Immediate cognition transcends itself, then, in the cognition by means of thought; in the ideal appropriation of reality. In advancing beyond the abstract determinations of action, this cognition becomes a process capable of recognizing itself as such ideal appropriation; a process conscious of itself. Cognition acquires, thus, form of consciousness.

The subject that disposes itself to ideally take possession of the necessity of its own action does not cease, for that reason, to start by facing the object of this action as something that is external to it, the subject. And, consequently, with this object by its immediate exteriority. Immediate exteriority, whose appearance the subject overcomes upon advancing beyond the abstract forms of its object. But when performing this advance it comes up, first of all, against the exteriority of the abstract forms themselves. From which, the appropriation of the real necessity by thought has, as most primitive specific form, the ideal setting by itself in causal relation the real forms (abstract and concrete ones) departing from the way they present themselves to it. That is, the mental conceiving of links among real forms on the basis of their exteriority; and, therefore, independently of their necessity. Cognition becomes, thus, a mental construction with a causality alien to the real one: the ideal *representation* of reality. The action based on such representation cannot do more than, at best, to cognize its own necessity by the apparent concatenations of this one; that is to say, in a correspondingly external mode. At worst, it does not go beyond imagining it in a purely fantastic manner. Hence, the specific limit that the potency of this action has.

The appropriation by thought of the real forms in their virtuality overcomes the exteriority of these forms ideally accompanying them in the unfolding of their real necessity. The way in which it mentally reproduces their real concatenations. It takes, thus, form of ideal *reproduction* of reality. On ideally

reproducing the necessity of real forms, the transforming action virtually takes possession of its own necessity in the integrity of it. Thereby its potency does not find a limit in the form itself of this taking of possession: the transforming action that cognizes its own necessity by means of the ideal reproduction of this one is the most developed concrete form of the becoming, i.e., of matter, with which we confront. We are referring, more than obviously, to the being generically human in the fullness of its actual development.

Seen now from the outside, just because it finds itself completely determined as necessary concrete form of matter, human action can transform other forms of matter into forms for itself; and, therefore, to transform itself. Insofar as it were alien to such determination -in other words, insofar as it were not the incarnation of the development of the necessity of matter under the corresponding concrete forms- human action would be impotent to act upon any of the concrete forms into which that necessity unfolds itself; upon any of the concrete forms of matter. Just as impotent as a pin is when faced with something which has the capacity of being broken into pieces only by a sledgehammer. And only because it finds itself completely determined as necessary concrete form of matter, human action necessarily becomes, in historical evolution, a *free* action: an action that cognizes its own necessity in the integrity of this necessity[11].

Of course, where necessity was presenting its concrete form of casualness, the human action that realized it may appear, always from an external point of view, with its determinations inverted.

[11] "Freedom of will is, then, nothing but the capacity of deciding with cognition of cause. Therefore, the *freer* the judgment of a human being with respect to a determined matter is, so much greater is the *necessity* with which the content of that judgment is going to be determined; ... [freedom] is, ..., necessarily, a product of historical development." "Freiheit des Willens heißt daher nichts andres als die Fähigkeit, mit Sachkenntnis entscheiden zu können. Je *freier* also das Urteil eines Menschen in Beziehung auf einen bestimmten Fragepunkt ist, mit desto größerer *Notwendigkeit* wird der Inhalt dieses Urteils bestimmt sein; ...; sie [Freiheit] ist ... notwendig ein Produkt der geschichtlichen Entwicklung." Engels, Friedrich *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft ("Anti-Dühring")*, Marx/Engels Ausgewählte Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, Vol. V, p. 128.

That is, determining by itself the existence of the necessity in question, and not as the concrete form in which this necessity realizes itself[12]. E.g., the radical transformation of capitalism into conscious regulation of social metabolism process has no general form of realizing itself other than the proletariat's voluntary action. But that transformation has this action as such form insofar as the will of the proletariat is inhabited by capital's necessity, capital's *will*, to annihilate itself in that superior social form. Hence, the revolutionary potency of the aforesaid voluntary action. To those who restrict their view of the voluntary action of the proletariat to the immediate concrete form of the realization of capitalism transformation, this action appears deprived of all potency but the one that emerges from the proletariat's will itself. It is not in vain that, in such exteriority, the possibility of capitalism to annihilate itself presents itself, not as an absolute necessity of this one, but as the absence of such necessity in it; and rather, as the pure and simple negation of this necessity. Sheltered in this apparent raising to absoluteness of the potency of the proletariat's voluntary action, the actual potency of this action as concrete form of capital's specific necessity is compelled to give way to the causal feebleness of its own concrete forms, transfigured -with the exclusion of their determinations- into pure abstractions: solidarity, organization, libertarian morale, of the proletariat. And, next to these, the still feebler pseudo-causality of the realization of abstract *eternal human values*, of *social justice*.

Consciously regulated action by means of the reproduction of reality by thought carries in itself, then, the advancing in the ideal unfolding of the necessity of the subject on which it is going to operate, to the point of being capable of recognizing its own concrete form -that is to say, to recognize itself- as necessary concrete form of existence of these potencies of the subject. Historic concrete form of regulation of human social metabolism

[12] The conversion of the possibility of this inversion into a general representation of the relation between human action and its object corresponds to the development of consciousness when the potencies of humanity confront it as potencies that are alien to it. For the moment, it is only fitting for us to point out the existence of the mentioned possibility, and at the same time, the existence of its necessary transition into generalized representation.

process, capital accumulation turns itself into the concrete object itself of social production and consumption. Capital becomes, thus, the specific subject of autonomously regulated social metabolism process. As such subject, capital is the concrete form of human life under which all the generic potencies of this life transfigure themselves into potencies of the social product. So that, the very same concrete human life becomes necessary personification of capital, capital's own form of existence. But, if this inversion reaches its fullness in the accumulation of capital, the commodity originally carries it in itself already as the general necessity of independent private producers to produce value, transfiguring the production of use values into the vehicle of the production of the general social relation. Commodity is, then, the simplest specific social subject where social metabolism process takes form in an autonomously regulated general interdependent system[13]. Subject that realizes its necessity as such, transforming itself into capital, by giving this autonomous regulation its finished form of production of value: its form of valorization of value. Capital has, as its specific historical potency, its transformation into a consciously regulated social metabolism process; social transformation in whose personification capital places the proletariat. In its development, this revolutionary potency of capital eliminates, by itself, its opposite, the mere reproduction of capitalism. It is, therefore, a simple historical necessity, not a possibility, of capital, insofar as it is determined by this one. In other words, it is a historical necessity of capital whose realization cannot be determined, in itself, as possibility. But this realization of capital necessarily materializes itself in the realization of that potency that is its opposite; that is to say, it materializes itself as historical process. Therefore, the concrete forms of realizing capital's simple necessity of annihilating itself into a superior social organization has no other immediate form of necessity than the one of possibilities of that opposite potency to this simple necessity. This is, just to begin, the concrete form of the necessity of the temporal quantitative determination of such annihilation[14].

13 "... neither 'value' nor 'exchange value' are subjects, rather it is only a *commodity*. ... which is the simplest economic concrete" "... no son sujetos ni el 'valor' ni el 'valor de cambio', sino que solamente lo es la mercancía. ...que es el concreto económico más simple." Marx, Karl

Being a historical realization of consciously regulated social metabolism process -i.e., of the full expression of the transforming action that cognizes its own necessity-, whose development takes the concrete form of possibility in the reproduction of its opposite, the radical transformation of society specifically takes form as immediately such in the proletariat's conscious action grounded upon the reproduction of reality by thought. Our revolutionary action only carries in itself the complete, and therefore true, cognition of cause -in other words, it is a consciously revolutionary action- when, in each time and place, it recognizes itself as the concrete form in which capital's immanent necessity of developing material productive forces of society until abolishing itself is realized[15].

Marginal Notes on Wagner's "Lehrbuch der Politischen Ökonomie", edited in *El Capital*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1973, T. I, pp. 714 y 718.

[14] This form of necessity belongs to the determination of our historical social being, as much as it belongs to our natural individual being. From the time they are born, all individuals take with themselves the simple necessity of their own death. Alien in itself to possibility, this necessity has no concrete form of realizing itself other than as the possibility of the development of its opposite, individual life process. The alienation of the generic human being in capital leaves human persons only in possession of their abstract individual being; and thereby, emptied of the simple capacity to take consciousness of the determinations of this abstract individuality. Hence, the consciousness of the form of necessity in question does not find itself less determined by such alienation with respect to natural human individuality than with respect to historical social being. Moreover, the development of consciousness of one's own individual determinations by means of the ideal reproduction of them has, as an inescapable moment of its own, the development of equal consciousness regarding one's own generic determinations; as the former determinations are necessary concrete forms of the latter ones.

[15] In that it is self-annihilation, capital only potentially carries the specific concrete forms of social metabolism process consciously regulated as its own absolute negation. Beyond this expression of its own as pure negativity, capital's potentiality does not reach the concrete forms we are referring to, neither in what they have of simple necessity, nor in what they have of possible necessity: these concrete forms are completely alien to such potentiality. The same happens with commodity's

3. The concrete form of dialectical cognition process

a. From the determination of reality by the process of its ideal reproduction to the formal manifestation of this reproduction as such

Our ideal appropriation of reality starts by facing the subject whose necessity is going to reproduce, by the form of this subject that is cognizable to us independently from the participation of thought in that cognition in itself. This portion of our cognition presents itself to us, thus, from the point of view of the ideal appropriation of reality, as an immediate perception. Where the capacity of immediate perception to virtually appropriate the necessity of the real subject over which we are going to act ends, the necessity itself of ideal appropriation is born. With which, the concrete form that is immediately appropriable presents itself as the exteriority of the named subject. Considered as abstractly independent moments of the process of appropriation of reality by thought, the product of immediate perception is, then, the starting point of ideal reproduction in itself. To be even more accurate, that perception is the starting point of the process of analysis that integrates this reproduction; process of analysis that, parting from the exteriority perceived, must advance discovering by means of thought the more and more abstract forms of the necessity of the subject concerning it. Then, the reality that our immediate perception apprehends is not a form that simply belongs to the perceived subject and, as such, completely external to ourselves. That reality is the unity between the exterior manifestation of the determinations of this subject and the determinations inherent in our capacity of perception, in our perceptive sense. Nothing is blue simply in itself. The *blue* is the real unity between the determinations of certain light, surface, atmospheric state, etc. and the normal functioning of our visual

potentiality. These forms are then, in the same measure, completely nonexistent nowadays. Consequently, the pretension of their cognition is nothing but a miserable discoursing over purely fantastic forms; the one of their personification, sycophant's hypocrisy.

system. Reality immediately appropriated is as much an attribute of our determination, such that an alteration of this functioning while the determinations inherent to the perceived exteriority stay untouched, is enough for the *blue* not to be *blue*. In their indissoluble unitary development, the analysis and the ideal reproduction itself of the subject over which we are going to act consequently need to account for the real determinations themselves of our capacity of immediate perception concretely in play with respect to the exterior reality immediately perceived of that subject.

The determination of the reality apprehended by our process of immediate perception, that emerges from this very process, can go further than the simple unity between the conditions of our capacity of perception and the exteriority of the necessity we approach to reproduce. When facing a concrete form, our process of perceiving it in its immediateness can turn to be, itself, determination of the necessity of this form, upon transforming the one that was originally there. Circumstance that should not horrify anybody: in the first place, this perception is the material form of the process of cognition that relates itself, in its own materiality, with the materiality of the real form whose necessity is going to ideally appropriate that process. In the second place, the circumstance under consideration does not introduce any condition to the process of ideal reproduction of reality, other than the necessity of accounting for the determination that it generates; just in the same way as this process needs to do so with the rest of the determinations that pertain to the necessity of the affected concrete form whose realization our action is going to personify. The same thing would happen if, in their own materiality as processes of pure thought, as materially ideal developments, the other two moments of the dialectical cognition process (the analysis and the unfolding of the ideal reproduction itself) would have the capacity, still to be seen, of generating by themselves the determination we are referring to.

In its turn, the discovering of the abstract forms of real necessity by analysis and the ideal reproduction of this necessity in the strict sense have to deal with the determination of our capacity itself of realizing them, that arises from the alienation of our own capacity of consciousness, in capital. Under its simplest form, the alienation of human potencies as capital's potencies

necessarily takes shape, with respect to the consciousness itself of this alienation, as the impossibility to ideally reproduce reality. It is not in vain that this reproduction is, in itself, the negation of alienated consciousness. Therefrom, the very necessity of the ideal representation of reality as general form of scientific cognition in capitalism; necessity that is so much so, as to decisively impose itself over the weaker potency to really appropriate matter (and, consequently, for the production of surplus-value, this production abstractly considered as pure form of organization of the material process of social metabolism), that is capable to support this representation in comparison with the ideal reproduction of reality. Now then, so generically alienated consciousness in capital, ours, as much as any other, the corresponding ideological forms have their place in its determination. Ideological forms precisely embodied in the ideal representation of social forms and, due to the inescapable universal extension of the same necessity, in the ideal representation of reality in general. But, insofar as the proletariat's own consciousness that carries in itself capital's necessity to develop the conscious regulation of social metabolism process annihilating itself, our consciousness finds itself specifically determined as the very necessity of realizing the ideal reproduction of reality. The consciousness thus determined, our revolutionary consciousness, is not the simple negation of alienated consciousness, but the negation of the negation of free consciousness. As such, ideological determinations have not merely vanished from this consciousness of ours. But the presence in it of these ideological determinations overcomes itself in the specific determination of the necessity of our consciousness to account for that presence, ideally reproducing its necessity. This ideal reproduction is, then, a necessary moment of the cognition itself of our own necessity. Such a moment is going to turn up every time that the ideological determinations in question are pertinent to the concrete necessity which we are going to incarnate with our action. Analysis and the ideal reproduction of reality in the strict sense have no way in which to embody themselves, if it is attempted to leave aside the unfolding of the necessity of such determinations, to the extent that corresponds to

this unfolding[16].

While the ideal reproduction of a concrete real form is under development, its necessity as such reproduction does not manifest itself immediately -that is to say, by its very form- to the exterior. The immediate perception faces a multitude of concrete real forms; none of which reveal, in that immediateness, that it may precisely be the one whose potency corresponds to incarnate with our action. The analysis of each concrete real form faces, in its turn, the mass of abstract forms enclosed in it; abstract forms where each one of them is as really present there as the others. The ideal unfolding of the possibility that each real abstract form carries in itself has to deal, to close the circuit, with the multitude of concrete forms in which it takes shape in an equally real manner. These multitudes and masses, obviously, do not even leave aside the ideological forms in which the regulation of the social metabolism process materializes when it is historically fitting for ideal appropriation of reality to have its development in representation. And they equally include the purely real forms inherent to immediate perception and the ones of the same type that the development of the cognition process eventually generates by itself. But, precisely for having no other guide than the unfolding of the real necessity -and excluding from itself, hence, any presupposition- the ideal reproduction of reality finds, in the apparent tortuousness of its path, just a formal determination. Which is not trivial: from the viewpoint of the cognition process in itself, the development of that reproduction is nothing else but the overcoming of this formal determination.

Inasmuch as the magnitude of this tortuousness leaves truncated the course of the ideal reproduction, at whatever point

[16] In the need to believe that there is no form of appropriation of reality by thought other than it itself, ideal representation sees in ideological determination an absolute limit to human capacity to consciously regulate action. It projects thus, to genus, what is of its own as species. And it does so with such conviction, that taking for granted the insuperable ideological determination of all scientific cognition, that is to say, to condemn science once and for all to the cultivation of apparent concatenations, is normally seen nowadays as the quintessence of the historically conscious critique of the current general form of that cognition.

in the course this occurs, this reproduction does not come to take the concrete form which is able to give the action at stake the consciousness of its own necessity. This action will be consequently blind, lacking of freedom. Nevertheless, no matter how great this tortuousness may be, none of the forms we face fall short of taking us, directly or indirectly, to the form that opportunly corresponds to the ideal reproduction of our concrete object. Even the forms that are irrelevant to such reproduction or merely apparent and, therefore, equally false concerning the unfolding of the necessity in question. It happens that, regarding matter, there are no non-transcendent forms; forms able to affirm themselves without ending up going beyond themselves. When we follow, in one direction or another, these forms which are out of place, they are going to show themselves as impotent for embodying the appearance of a reproduction of reality by thought. Through a greater or lesser detour, those forms are going to lead us back to the point in which we originally faced them. So that they place us again on the track of the true determination in play, by making evident to us the necessity of approaching among the forms that are there, others different to them.

It is this same necessity of going beyond its term, inherent to all forms of matter, the one that by itself makes evident any degeneration of the ideal reproduction of reality into a representation of reality. Such degeneration necessarily embodies in the interruption of the ideal flow of the real forms to introduce, from outside this flowing, a form that presents itself accounting for its own necessity, by itself; this introduced form is undoubtedly from a real source, as there are no other ones. That is to say, the degeneration we are referring to embodies in the representation of this real form as an assumption, a category, through which the development of the necessity of the object under study is said to pass.

Let us take, for example, the attempt of sustaining the development of the ideal reproduction of any social process in the sole will of those who personify this process. Be it that this attempt articulates itself by imputing the regulation of social metabolism to the *producer's rationality* or to the *consumer's preferences*; be it that it does so by imputing the -no less imputed- *failure* of a social revolutionary transformation to its leaders'

betrayal[17]. To go ahead with the ideal appropriation of the social process on such basis it is a must not to ask that *rationality* and those *preferences*, from where their historical character emerges; nor to ask this *betrayal*, for the necessity that such revolutionary transformation truly carries in itself, so as to have no less than this very one as general form of developing[18].

In other words, it is only possible to go further with the aforesaid ideal appropriation starting from the introduction of categories, taking them uncritically for what even themselves say they are not: answers that do not carry in themselves any further questions. In its necessity of non-transcendence to sustain itself as foundation -i.e., by its mere form of assumption-, the form forced into the course of the ideal appropriation faces us with the

[17] This category, the *will* abstracted from its determinations, exerts a particular fascination upon the worshippers of the modern systems of representation of social processes. This could not be otherwise. To begin with, it would certainly be surprising to find any social process that would not take the concrete form of human voluntary action. As this abstract *will* carries in itself so great a truism, the appearance of universality that concerns generic determination is guaranteed for it. And, to which concrete form of social processes, but to this one, will an appeal be made by those who represent, as the true cause of phenomena, the immediate form of phenomena: such modality of representation precisely has the reason of its present generality in the necessity of false consciousness concerning alienation of human potencies in capital. If this representation is found to be quite haggard lately in its already traditional versions of *revolutionary will*, *democratic will*, the *will to advance*, the *will to dominate*, etc., this is only because the season to present itself under the pedantic vainglory of one's own shortsightedness, so to the post-modern taste, as *rational expectations*, *rational choice*, but actually, *irrational philistinism*, has arrived.

[18] Let us add, by the way, that the so ubiquitous and so serviceable invocation to *betrayal* and other *deviations* of the same kind, has its other-self in pseudo-self-criticism. The only secret of pseudo-self-criticism resides in the abomination of one's own passed actions, uttering doleful *mea culpa* and rending one's garments in the most visible way, but taking at the same time good care of asking oneself about the social necessity that one has incarnated as to have performed actions today so infamous and, even more, about the social necessity that one incarnates now, that has such jeremiad-like apparent self-criticism as necessary concrete form.

evidence of its exteriority with respect to any real necessity of the concrete subject in question. And, with this evidence, to the evidence that the cognition in which it participates has at once abandoned its condition of ideal reproduction of reality, to change itself into a representation of reality. In itself, the process of dialectical cognition is nothing else but the uncompromising practice of criticism, the rejection of any pretension to only see an answer precisely where this answer has immediately turned itself into a new question that demands to be answered[19].

In the very moment that the reproduction of reality by thought reaches its completeness under the concrete form in which our action is able to account for its own necessity, it externally manifests itself as such. It does so, by presenting the form of an uninterrupted symmetric double flow of material forms ideally appropriated; a flow that departs from the concrete form that immediately faces our action, to advance from one to another to the interior of forms more and more abstract. The most abstract of which places it on the return path. In the unfolding of this path, each form previously gone through reappears in the inverse order, as concrete form that comes out of the development of the necessity virtually enclosed in the one that precedes it. Thus, until the reappearance of that initial form, now recognized as bearer of a potency whose realization has our action as necessary concrete form.

19 "In its rational form, [dialectic] is a scandal and horror to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire speakers, because in the positive comprehension of what exists, it encloses also, at the same time, the comprehension of its negation, of its necessary decline, it apprehends each actual form in the flow of its movement, therefore, also in its perishable facet, it lets nothing impose itself upon it, it is critical and revolutionary in essence." "In ihrer rationellen Gestalt ist sie dem Bürgertum und seinen doktrinären Wortführern ein Ärgernis und ein Greuel, weil sie in dem positiven Verständnis des Bestehenden zugleich auch das Verständnis seiner Negation, seines notwendigen Untergangs einschließt, jede gewordne Form im Flusse der Bewegung, also auch nach ihrer vergänglichen Seite auffaßt, sich durch nichts imponieren läßt, ihrem Wesen nach kritisch und revolutionär ist." Marx, Karl *Das Kapital*, Ullstein Verlag, Frankfurt, 1980, T. I, p. 12., Vol. I, p. 12.

b. The advance from singular to general: cognition and recognition

In so far as each one of our actions is singular realization of human appropriation of matter regulated by means of the reproduction of its necessity by thought, it encloses the complete unfolding of that reproduction concerning the concrete subject that is individually pertinent to it. This complete unfolding finds itself embodied in that of the indissoluble double process of analysis and synthetic reproduction. Any mutilation of this process carries in itself the annihilation of the ideal reproduction of the necessity of the corresponding concrete subject. A thing that such mutilation does even when our dialectical cognition has already advanced over the non-singular portion of this subject, as a consequence of having developed itself over another singularity of the same generic and specific subject.

With the advance of dialectical cognition, the necessary formal integrity of the ideal reproduction of each real concrete develops into the division of the simple cognition process. In this division the formal integrity denies itself as simply such, to affirm itself in the unity of a process of cognition in itself and one of recognition. Insofar as it goes through forms whose particular necessity has not been unfolded before, the process of cognition acquires the first character. Insofar as it does so through forms whose necessity has already been unfolded with respect to another concrete existence of the same subject (existence that shares those forms with the one we face now) the process of cognition acquires the second character. By means of this division, the process of dialectical cognition advances through the mass of real forms that it faces at each step with the potency that it obtains by advancing in this way -in the corresponding part- as a recognition process, while it keeps untouched, in this advance, its necessary individual integrity.

Let us go a little further regarding the relation between these two moments that give form to each concrete process of ideal reproduction of reality. It is not about analytically reaching the first abstract form of our subject that is already cognized by us, to return without further ado unfolding its necessity, to the one corresponding to our concrete action. To begin with, the only place where that abstract form can take us concerning its

necessity is to the contiguous simpler form contained in it. From which, the immediate return from the form in question to the one of our specific interest is the mutilation of the unfolding of the necessity of this last one. And it is rather the degradation of the process of ideal reproduction of reality to one of mere representation of reality: that return is only possible by forcing the introduction of a necessity incapable of arising by itself in the developed path.

For example, when the process of cognition of a social form concrete enough to give it space, analytically reaches class struggle in itself as such struggle, it has before itself nothing but a succession of encounters, advances and retreats, on the part of the classes in conflict. The necessity of such movements is far from reducing itself to these movements themselves. It is precisely in the portion that such necessity exceeds these movements as generically its own, that the ideal reproduction of this generic necessity already integrates social cognition: it is long ago that dialectical cognition had appropriated it. Let us assume, then, that taking the cognition of this generic necessity as given, it is intended to consider the analytical advance on the spot as finished and to start the return to the social concrete form of specific interest. But once the unfolding of the necessity of class struggle is mutilated, and the unity of this necessity in a purely external manner reestablished, this struggle continues to be unable to provide such a return, as expression of its own necessity, but its form itself. The analytical process which stops upon reaching the mentioned concrete forms of class struggle, and even upon reaching any of the abstract forms of this struggle as such, can do nothing other than open the door for the representation of the determinations inherent to the concrete social form in question more abstract than the manifestations of that struggle analytically reached in the occasion. Service, that is carried out under the shelter of the abstract existence of the generic reproduction of the necessity of class struggle, gives the resulting representation a varnish of reproduction of the real necessity. Of the integral cognition of the necessity of the concrete social form faced, only the appearance thus remains.

Let us consider another example. Let us now assume, that with an argument similar to the previous one, it is intended to ideally reproduce the necessity of a social form more concrete than the

price of production, considering that the analytical process has been satisfied upon reaching this price. In its own immediateness, the price of production cannot account for the necessity that imposes itself in the assignation of the total labour of society among the different specific spheres of production in a system of social metabolism that autonomously regulates itself by making, the material production, production of the general social relation. In that same immediateness, the price of production is also not able to account for the necessity that imposes itself in the determination of the magnitude of the surplus-labour rendered by direct producers, in this same system. This double impotence of the price of production is not surprising at all, as this price is the specifically capitalist concrete form of both necessities. So that, to advance towards more concrete forms than the price of production, the external reestablishing -therefore, mutilation- of the development of the necessity of this price only leaves room for the direct representation of the named assignation. That is, to the representation of the commodity by its opposite, direct social product. Inversion to which consequently follows the introduction of the magnitude of surplus-labour by means of the assumption of its determination in an equally empty way. And from here, the depriving of surplus-value, at least, of its historical specificity; if not of all determination, aside from the very manifestation of its magnitude as rate of profit.

Therefore, it is about accompanying the complete unfolding of the necessity of the concrete singular subject, ideally reproducing this subject, from its simplest form to its concrete form that is specifically pertinent to our action. Consequently, the formal unity of the ideal reproduction shows itself completed in its integrity, with equal singularity. It is only that, insofar as recognition process, such unfolding obviously requires a substantially smaller effort than its portion corresponding to the strictly original cognition process. This occurs to the extent that reiterative practice of the recognition of a generic subject transforms the process of this recognition into a sufficiently agile one, even when it advances through extremely concrete forms of the generic subject that concerns it, as to make it only externally perceptible by the presence of its result.

The realization, by us or by others, of any potency pertinent to our condition of concrete subjects renews the necessity of our

action in a consequently singular manner. This renewal determines the necessity to renew our dialectical cognition. In the corresponding concrete singularity of each of its renewals, dialectical cognition submits to criticism the portion of itself developed up to that moment. It makes this portion account for its condition of ideal reproduction of reality faced with the movement of the subject that concerns it. And it cannot avoid doing so: such critique takes shape in the form itself of the process of ideal reproduction of reality. In the place where the forms discovered by the preexistent cognition do not arise again from the renewed double movement that integrates it, this preexistent cognition shows itself as not being such cognition anymore; whereas the new cognition process from which this evidence emerges, manifests having developed itself, there-at, as a simply original one[20]. The formal determination of the dialectical

[20] Since dialectical cognition automatically submits to criticism its own preexistent forms, this criticism has no manifestation as purely such criticism other than the ideal reproduction of the real metamorphosis that mediates between the primitive concrete and its present form. It goes without saying that, in its just as equal purity, the dialectical critique of the ideal representation of reality has a specifically different modality. The matter is no longer to account for the necessity of the transformation that has happened in the real concrete we are ideally appropriating, but to account for the necessity due to which the corresponding portion of the social consciousness can only appropriate this concrete by representing it by its apparent concatenations. As soon as our action includes, in the development of its own necessity, the criticism of a certain cognition materialized in ideal forms alien to the reproduction of the corresponding real forms, or the criticism of essentially ideological forms, our action has to face the representation in question and make it provide testimony to the necessity of its determination as such a cognition that does not go beyond appearances. It is appropriate to add here, that the critique that intends to found its own reality on the incoherence of the criticized ideal development with itself has no where to get more reality content than from the reality that has that incoherence itself. The coherence of ideal development with itself may correspond to, and along the way conceal by its own character, the most absolute emptiness of reality. No matter how much such critique looks down upon the critique that limits itself to utter invectives against the ideal development which is taken as its object, it does not escape from the same condition of this object: that of being only an apparent critique. The

cognition process itself, by which this needs to unfold itself every

true criticism to present vulgar economy materializes itself in the unfolding of the necessity of the commodity under its concrete form of mental representation of the regulation of the capitalist system on the basis of abstract individual *will*, the manifestation of this *will* conceived as *marginal utility*. Hence, the specific historical determination of capitalism is represented as a simply natural necessity of the social metabolism process, as an ahistorical necessity. This critical unfolding will have no way to exhaust itself, thus, before showing us the ideological necessity of the commodity metamorphosed into capital to embody itself in the apologetics of capitalism as the eternal form of social organization, with the capitalist as the self-denying natural agent of this organization. In such a way, this unfolding will have no means of exhausting itself without previously revealing to us how this ideological necessity of capital makes way for itself in the determination of those who personify it. Such ideological necessity is so powerful as to massively produce those who have the impudence to, without loosing their composure, openly admit the purely constructive inescapable incoherence of the *theory of factors of production rewarded for their marginal productivity*, a theory with which it is essential for them to conceive of the apparent relation between social classes and their revenues. Moreover, that same unfolding will not allow us to even stop at this point. Just by following it a little further, it will settle us in the track of the specific necessity of a different variety of present-day political economy. It will show us, thus, how such specific necessity gives strength to this theoretical variety to begin by presenting itself as the irreducible critique of the apologetics of capitalism, thanks to putting into evidence, with no further ado, and sticking to the sole logic of *marginalist* theory, the aforesaid incoherence of this with itself. Having done this, it will show us that this variety already needs to give way to the exposition of its own conception by representing the value-form of products of labour in capitalism (abstract labour materialized in commodities that represents itself as the capacity of commodities to enter into relation between themselves in exchange) by the substance of this form (pure and simple abstract human labour materialized in its product), by means of the *labour theory of value*. In other words, it is going to show us that the theoretical variety we are referring to needs to embody itself in the representation of the commodity, of the general social relation in the autonomously regulated human metabolism process by its opposite, immediately social product. From this representation the specificity of capitalism as form of regulation of that process has consequently vanished. Following this, it is always the same unfolding which is going to show us that this theoretical variety needs to represent the historical necessity of capitalism to revolutionize

time in its concrete singularity, provides the same critical quality even to the process of the pure learning of that cognition; namely, to the process of individual cognition whose development has as its specific necessity, instead of the regulation of the action immediately practicable on the real singular form that it ideally reproduces, the transformation of this process itself into one of recognition with respect to the generic determinations of the necessity of the action at stake. And that same formal determination does not cease giving learning such critical quality, though this process of individual cognition does not transcend, even an iota, the real forms that are presupposed to have already been entirely appropriated by social cognition.

We can very well say, then, that the question is not about *reading Capital*; nor even about *studying* it. The point is truly to face capital's real forms by ourselves to ideally reproduce them, with the potency we acquire by having at our disposal their ideal reproduction developed in *Capital*. Thus, our ideal reproduction of the social forms over which we need to act has, in the corresponding part, the potency of directly being a recognition process from the social point of view. This is a potency that already manifests itself as such when this cognition process of our own finds itself in its first moment of development: the one of

itself until annihilating itself in the conscious control of the social metabolism process, by the imposition of an abstract *equilibrium* of the social reproduction process by means of an increasing trend in the *participation* of wages in the social product; if not, by the *morally indispensable* advance of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the struggle for the *distribution* of that product. From which, *voilà*, socialism (the consciously regulated social metabolism process) comes to be nothing else but capitalism (the social metabolism process that regulates itself behind the backs of its members'), when the rate of profit equals zero. From being the generic opposite of capitalism, socialism has thus been turned into a species of capitalism. Just by following the development of its real necessity, the critique of the most crude apologetics of capitalism and the capitalist based upon denouncing the abstract logical incoherence of marginalist theory, shows what it truly hoards in its heart: the most crude apologetics of capitalism when the concentration of capital under the still incipient forms of collective property already starts to turn anachronic the jesuitic figure of the abstinent capitalist for vulgar economy.

necessarily being a process of simple original cognition from the individual point of view.

It does not matter which singular form of a concrete subject we take to unfold our process of simple cognition. By doing so, we will have transformed it into the cornerstone upon which our cognition process will turn out to be a recognition process, when we face other existences of the concrete subject we are dealing with[21]. But that form where the necessity that specifically defines the subject as such finds itself most developed, is the most potent one in this sense. What in the more primitive expressions of the subject has only actual existence as a potency, is found in actual fact in this more developed expression of the subject. Potencies that do not even insinuate themselves in those expressions, show themselves as the concrete virtuality of the most developed one. And, after all, real forms are only interesting for our action itself - and, therefore, for us in general- in what they potentially have in themselves. To say it once more, the point is to personify these potencies in full cognition of cause; i.e., with their necessity entirely unfolded before us[22].

[21] "..., and the reader that, after all, wants to follow me, must decide to ascend from singular to general." "..., und der Leser, der mir überhaupt folgen will, sich entschließen muß, von dem einzelnen zum allgemeinen aufzusteigen." Marx, Karl *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*, Marx/Engels Ausgewählte Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, Vol. II, p. 501.

[22] "The anatomy of humans is a key to the anatomy of apes" "Die Anatomie des Menschen ist ein Schlüssel zur Anatomie des Affen." Marx, Karl Manuscript edited as *Einleitung ..., op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 491. We cannot overlook that Marx immediately adds that: "Conversely, the signs of the superior forms in the lower animal species can only be understood when the superior form itself is known." "Die Andeutungen auf Höhres in den untergeordnetren Tierarten können dagegen nur versatnden werden, wenn das Höhere selbst schon bekannt ist." This statement from Marx, included in fact in a draft that he did not publish, is completely pulverized by his own action. Marx discovers the historic specificity of capitalism and the concrete forms in which this specificity is to be realized without having in front of himself a more developed social form other than capitalism itself. This discovery is, by itself, the discovery of the historical necessity of socialism such as this necessity has its actual existence in capitalism: the one of being a pure potency of the inferior social form, capitalism. Our conscious action would be quite dead if, to

We see in passing, that abstractly, and therefore externally considered in themselves, all that dialectical cognition gets from practice based upon it, is a new real concrete that it needs to face. A concrete that is more developed than the one upon which action has been executed: one of those that were the original concrete's potencies, is now simple existence; the trend has allowed space for its result, so to speak. All that dialectical cognition consequently gets from practice based upon it is a richer new starting point from which it reproduces itself in the thus renewed satisfaction of its aims; it is the same that it obtains from any action, even though the regulation of this one had been alien to it.

c. The general course of the development of the capacity to consciously personify the necessity of real concrete forms

The simpler the form of a concrete subject that is fitting to embody in a certain modality of our action is, the sooner the unfolding of the necessity of this action in the development of the ideal reproduction of such subject is completed. Only with the further advance of this ideal reproduction, does the unfolding of the necessity of such modalities of our action which is able to realize increasingly concrete forms of that same subject, achieve equal status. In the determination of this sequence, here too, the form alone of dialectical cognition process imposes itself: the

change a form through this action, we should have to wait until this form is already transformed to cognize it in its original potentiality: such a circumstance would be the negation itself of the possibility of our conscious action. It is not surprising then, the fascination that this assertion produces on those who have as their historic necessity the need to present Marx himself as stating that interpretation, therefore ideology, is the only form in which scientific cognition can appropriate that which is in potency; and as we can only really appropriate that which is in potency, stating that ideology, the alienated consciousness in capital, is the necessarily eternal form of human consciousness. In the best magister dixit uncritical style, this paragraph is quoted again and again as revealed truth when the ideological speakers in question assume they are dealing with the foundations of the dialectic method.

completion of the ideal unfolding of the necessity of a real concrete form is the condition for the ideal unfolding of the necessity of the more concrete ones, in which that same form develops itself. It is thus about, the general order of the advancing of our capacity to regulate our action under the form of dialectical cognition.

While we have not reached the point in which we can recognize the singular concrete form of our action as the necessary one in which the respective potency of the subject in play realizes itself, this action will be correspondingly blind. To overcome such blindness with respect to the singular concrete action to be executed, it will be worthless for us to recognize the simple determinations of this action as identical with those of another action that is realization of potencies that already belong wholly to our cognition; an action, the latter, which we face, therefore, as a genuinely free one. This recognition is impotent, by itself, to overcome the mere appearance of similarity between one and the other action, in the concrete determinations of these actions that exceed it. And we know for sure, that no matter how similar it may look to that named free action, the action shaped on the basis of this appearance can be the plain and simple negation of the potencies that are attempted to be incarnated: it is not in vain that the simple forms affirm themselves by negating themselves in their concrete ones[23].

Let us take, for example, the following aspects of the development of the proletariat's organizational capacity. The proletariat's revolutionary organization is necessary concrete form of the immanent potency of capital to annihilate itself into a superior social form. The ideal reproduction of the general forms of capital accumulation process is sufficient to discover it. Therefrom, the opportunity of the First International as conscious realization of this organization. But, as this potency takes concrete form -which is equally necessary- in the political parties of national proletariats, it does so specifically determined by the

[23] "-and all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance and the essence of things immediately coincided-" "-und alle Wissenschaft wäre überflüssig, wenn die Erscheinungsform und das Wesen der Dinge unmittelbar zusammenfielen-" Marx, Karl *Das Kapital*, *op. cit*, Vol. III, p. 763.

national form of the capital accumulation process. And this form is in itself an expression of capital's potencies to counteract the development of the material productive forces of society. So much so, as to lead the national proletariats to confront among themselves with no less strength than that which the respective national portions of society's total capital exercise in the development of their accumulation processes. We need only to recall the crash of the Second International with the advent of World War I. It is no longer enough, here, to act in full cognition of cause, the consciousness of the general development of capital accumulation. The action capable of cognizing its necessity must unfold, to impose itself under the corresponding concrete forms, the ideal reproduction of national determinations to capital accumulation. In its turn, the parties of national proletariats take shape in their representatives. Necessarily mediating, in such representation, are the determinations to the concrete form in which the potencies of capital to revolutionize itself are individually personified. Among these determinations, the necessity to act in full cognition of cause is found; but all the stigma inherent to the labourer mutilated as individual by capital, are also there. Where capital realizes its possibility to annihilate itself through the very imposition of these personal determinations, as it certainly does, it is imposed upon us to account for the necessity of such individual representation of capital. We only achieve this aim upon ideally reproducing the determinations at stake, in their correspondingly personal singularity.

The magnitude of the task that dialectical cognition already has ahead of it springs up everywhere before us. Facing this magnitude, we are struck by the sterility of the time lost (time lost that appears to us as such, of course, from a point of view external to the concrete determinations of its necessity) since the cognition of reality by means of its ideal reproduction -i.e., by means of dialectical cognition- was nearly interrupted at the stage reached by Marx; by Engels, although at times conflating it with representation; and, concerning the simplest determinations of matter, with his idealist inversion and all, by Hegel. It is made evident in the same way, the contradiction in its own terms, and better yet pharisaism, that is the pretension of leaving for a better opportunity the regulation of conscious revolutionary action by

means of the reproduction of its necessity by thought, under the claim of the urgency of that action and the magnitude of the work that this dialectical cognition requires. And it is made evident, with no less vigor, the savage mutilation of the potency acquired by social consciousness in the reproduction of the virtuality of the specific historical forms of today's society unfolded by Marx (savage mutilation that is capital's reaction upon confronting its own advancing up to that point), by means of the generalized reduction of such dialectical cognition to its specific opposite; that is, to an ideal representation of reality, to a theoretical cognition[24]; and, therefrom, to a conception of the world, to a system of thought; in one word, to *Marxism.*

[24] In spite of being unable to avoid the appearance that it is about the necessity of the idea itself, Hegel already clearly pointed out the difference between representation, whose development obeys a necessity external to its object, and dialectical cognition, that follows the unfolding of the necessity immanent to this object. As we have already seen, Marx makes it evident from the very beginning that his scientific method has as its result "the reproduction of the concrete by the path of thought". Nevertheless, Marx does not reach the development of the specific difference between this scientific cognition that ideally reproduces the real necessity and theoretical cognition, that only represents it. In other words, he does not come to face this ideal reproduction as the critique - i.e. the supersession- of scientific theory itself. This occurs to such an extent that he circumstantially refers to his own scientific works and discoveries as being of a theoretical nature. Certainly, in Marx's time scientific theory had not yet come to unfold its ideological determination as apologetics of capitalism no longer for its potency but for its lack of potency to transform nature in full cognition of cause; that is to say, scientific theory did not yet need to boast about its own limits to affirm the impossibility of the conscious regulation of the social metabolism process. Marx was then able to advance for the first time in the ideal reproduction of the real forms of capitalist society up until discovering its historical character, without confronting the necessity of making explicit the specific difference between that reproduction and theoretical representation, inasmuch as this difference embodies in the form itself of one and the other cognition process. But the sole materialization of this advance violently pushes scientific theory towards the exhaustion of its capacity of self-criticism in the complacency with respect to its own impotence. Thus the unfolding of the organicity of the proletariat's conscious revolutionary action nowadays presents immediately, the form of the critique of scientific theory.

d. The exposition of the ideal reproduction of reality

The ideal reproduction of reality is a product of the double process of analysis and synthesis, in its indissoluble unity. Nevertheless, it is only in the second moment of that process where the unfolding of the necessity of the subject under consideration properly takes place; and, therefore, where the ideal reproduction itself takes place. The exposition of this reproduction is consequently determined.

The development of the necessity that determines a subject as such, is, above all the negation of the subject in its potentiality, to affirm itself as realized necessity in its specific concrete forms. But this negation of potentiality negates itself in the affirmation of concrete forms as forms where the necessity already realized in them, is at the same time preserved as the very potency of these forms insofar as they are abstract ones themselves. The potency that defines the new form as a subject has emerged purely and exclusively from the primitive subject; from which, the new subject is nothing but the realized form of the primitive one and therefore, it itself. However, as the negation of the negation, this potency is nonexistent for that primitive subject in its abstract condition as such subject: it is just a potency inherent to the specific concrete forms of that subject. The potency that defines the subject as such, develops in this manner, a form of this subject that is not a mere species of the primitive subject. It is a form of the subject that differentiates itself as genus, that is to say, as potency, with respect to the primitive one; as such a new genus, this form is ready to develop its necessity.

Let us consider, for example, the commodity and its metamorphosis into money. The genesis of money is nothing more than the complete development of the specific concrete forms of the commodity as the simple unity of use-value and value. But money, specific concrete form of the commodity, carries in itself a necessity that is not only alien to the commodity as simply such, but that is the negation itself of the necessity of the commodity in its simplicity: as necessary concrete form of the product that is not directly social, money is the representative of directly social labour within commodity production. What the

commodity, as simply such, has no way of being, is what the commodity comes to be as money. The essential necessity of commodity, i.e., being the general social relation of the autonomously regulated human metabolism process, has thus developed itself up to the point of transforming itself into the necessity of the very concrete form of the commodity, money, that defines money as subject: money has no use-value other than being this general social relation. As such a subject that money has come to be, it deserves the same formal treatment as the commodity in our exposition.

Let us leap ahead and consider the development of cooperation into its concrete forms. At first, the division of labour in manufacture is nothing more than one of these concrete forms. But this division of labour immediately turns into a subject itself; a subject where the necessity inherent to simple cooperation has transformed itself into the potency to produce the specialized fragmented labourer. In its turn, the development of this potency takes concrete form in the mechanization of the production process. And thus, the potency to produce the specialized fragmentary labourer negates itself as such in the very development of its concrete forms, to affirm itself in the generically distinct potency of mechanized great industry to produce the universalized collective labourer. That is to say, the direct producer that carries in itself the material potency to organize the social metabolism process as a directly social process. The mechanization of production in great industry is a concrete form of relative surplus-value (in order not to go any further backwards), a concrete form of cooperation, a concrete form of the division of labour in manufacture (which it additionally has as its historical condition). However, it has a potency not yet developed in any of these simpler forms which it carries in itself. This mechanization formally deserves the same treatment in our exposition as given to each of those simpler subjects from where this necessity that defines mechanization itself as a subject arises.

Let us leap ahead for the last time and consider the production of capital on an increased scale. This capital accumulation is a necessary concrete form of the simple reproduction of capital. But the potency of capital does not get to develop itself, in simple reproduction, but as the reproduction itself of the conditions of

the valorization of capital; i.e. production and reproduction of the wage-labourer and the capitalist. It is only upon taking shape as the accumulation process, that capital's potency reaches its existence under the generic concrete form of capital's necessity to overcome private ownership of the means of production and to submit all production and consumption to science. And therefore, being the historical necessary form of the development of social metabolism process when the conscious regulation of this process has mutated from necessary generic concrete form to a specific barrier to that development, capital has come now to develop the necessity of the conscious regulation of social metabolism process as a necessity of a concrete form of itself. It is only under the form of self-accumulation, that capital has consequently acquired the potency to annihilate itself. Once more, our exposition is found formally determined by the presence of a subject that behaves itself, on its own, as such.

In need of making ideally evident the unfolding of a subject that is transforming itself in the once and again renewed affirming by means of self-negation, exposition necessarily presents the form of a nodal line, as general structure. Each concrete form that the subject takes in the metamorphosis of its generic capacity, determines the existence of the corresponding node. This node extends itself then, in the development of the necessity inherent to the subject that concerns it, in the concrete forms of this subject; and it links itself with the following node in the negation of the specific concrete form where the development of the necessity of our action passes through, by means of its affirmation as an abstract form with a generic necessity that is its own. In other words, the linking up of one expository node with the following one takes place at the point in which the necessity generically belonging to the simpler subject transforms itself into necessity to be realized by a specific concrete form of this subject.

The general delimitation of exposition by the unfolding of the process of ideal reproduction in the strict sense, then develops based on the splitting of the social cognition process into its two moments: genuinely original cognition and recognition. Of these moments, the one of recognition advances over the determinations that appear, from a point of view restricted to the action faced, as the generic ones of this action. In its turn, the one of cognition in itself advances over the determinations that appear

up till then, from the same point of view, corresponding to the specific necessity -strictly speaking, singular- of that same action. Once the ideal reproduction of these last determinations acquires the materialization that is inherent to social cognition, they are incorporated into the first ones, with respect to the renewal of the cognition process over another singular form of the same subject. The portion of the ideal reproduction of reality that encloses the advance specifically realized by social cognition in the occasion, completes the delimitation of the exposition in each concrete case.

Thus, the exposition of the historically specific potencies of the present process of social metabolism up to the point where the concrete forms of these potencies are unfolded as general laws of capital accumulation, developed in *Capital*, departs directly from the simplest specific concrete form that takes the social subject in capitalism; from the commodity. This exposition begins, hence, having left behind human beings simply producing their life, the forms belonging to human metabolism process as simply such. Insofar as these forms determine capitalist production, i.e., they have capitalist production as historical necessary concrete form, they are going to appear directly in the exposition when its consideration is essential to show the specificity of this production; they are going to appear, consequently, in this way, with the character of conditions of capitalist production. On the contrary, the exposition we are dealing with needs to show the completeness of the development of the determinations of the human social metabolism process as simply such, in that this process itself is a concrete form of capital.

Dialectical research cannot overlook any form pertinent to the development of the necessity of the concrete subject that is going to be personified. To do so is, at once, to destroy its condition as regulation of the corresponding action by means of the ideal reproduction of the real necessity of this action. The critical reading of the exposition of dialectical research unavoidably carries in itself the development of the research process itself by the reader, with the potency that it gives to this process having the original research as a base of support. The nature of this unity between dialectical cognition already produced and its critical reading results in the independence of exposition with respect to the necessity of strictly presenting, in it, each and all the ties

discovered by research in the development of abstract forms into their concrete necessary forms. According to its specific aim, the exposition can thus limit itself to fully unfold, among those discovered ties, only the ones essential for enhancing the critical reproduction of the research. It goes without saying that this modality is the one that normally fits the exposition of forms previously appropriated by social cognition -and that, therefore, present themselves as generic regarding the exposition underway- when such exposition imposes itself for the benefit of the critical reproduction of the specifically exposed research. As it happens, for example, with the exposition of capital's necessity to revolutionize itself, which is necessary for us to start the unfolding of the forms of dialectical cognition here, in contrast to the fullness with which this unfolding is found in *Capital*.

The unfolding of the necessity of the subject whose concrete form we are going to personify with our conscious action gives shape to the exposition. But the reader that advances reproducing by him/herself such unfolding, unavoidably faces, in this critical process, forms that do not belong to the concrete subject in question but that relate themselves to this concrete subject by being different specific forms of the same simple subject. Inasmuch as the expositor him/herself has faced these forms during his/her own process of original cognition and considers it opportune to accompany the reader in their unfolding, or even making the reader notice their existence, it is fitting for him/her to incorporate this unfolding or indication in his/her exposition. Such inclusion in the body itself of the exposition undermines however, the fluidity of the unfolding of the necessity of the concrete subject truly at stake. By nature, this particular exposition takes the form of a footnote[25].

[25] The science that only knows how to give their sole immediate manifestation as the cause of concrete forms, is horrified by the very possibility of critical reading. This science wishes that the reader goes through the text as quickly as possible, swallowing it without a chance of reasoning on her/his own about its content. Hence, this uncritical science detests the type of footnotes we are referring to. For the footnotes which manage to survive the rules of the *proper scientific writer textbook* ("do your best to exclude them"), it has imposed the practice of clustering them at the end of the main text. This is a way to induce skipping over them, by diluting the immediate organic relation between both portions

Within the determination of its course and specific field, the development of exposition necessarily takes concrete form in the researcher's capacity to carry it out with a greater or lesser degree of expressiveness. In *Capital*, for example, Marx gives a particular modality to the necessarily nodal structure of exposition. He does so, starting by facing a concrete form that, for the moment, has no justification regarding its necessity as subject, other than being placed there as such; or more precisely, being placed there as a mere object. It is such that the first step in the exposition of the necessity of this subject is the exposition of the analysis of this same subject, departing from its own exteriority in which it is placed. This analysis extends itself until discovering the necessity that specifically defines the subject under consideration as such subject. The research process which has truly resulted in this discovery, thus appears represented, in the exposition, as an abstractly analytical one. Having shown the subject's specific to-be-realized necessity, the exposition accompanies the unfolding of this one, i.e., the development of the subject's concrete forms. This task is performed by the exposition until the subject develops itself into one or more specific concrete forms that have the inherent necessity of the initial simple form, no longer merely as necessity that determines them as such concrete forms, but as to-be-realized necessity that is their own. On showing its necessity in this way, the subject specifically considered makes evident, by itself, that the necessity which was its original one (at the beginning only visible in the analytical exposition, and, therefore, externally to it as such subject) is its very own. The exposition of the unfolding of the necessity of the specific subject under consideration justifies, thus, the necessity of its own starting point. Having reached this stage of progress, the exposition does not continue simply flowing in the development of this renewed necessity of the subject; i.e., developing the metamorphosis of the concrete forms of the subject, into subjects themselves. Rather, the exposition directly turns to face the specific form of the subject that is the realization already accomplished by such necessity, from the very externality of this form appearing on its own

of the exposition due to the mediation of the process of flipping back and forth from one to the other.

account. With this opening of a new node, the formal circuit of exposition begins anew.

Let us look at this particular expository structure in its concrete crystallization. *Capital* starts by facing the commodity without any manifested reason for doing so, other than being, the commodity, the elemental form of wealth in capitalist society. The analysis subsequently presented in the exposition makes evident that the commodity is the general social relation among private independent producers. As from having shown, thus, the necessity of the commodity, it is the commodity itself which appears in the exposition unfolding, by itself, its concrete value-forms, in which that necessity inherent to it takes shape. In this, its own unfolding, commodity comes to transform itself into money; that is to say, into the concrete form of commodity that is nothing else but the direct materialization of social labour. Already far from its starting abstract immediateness, and even from the analytical externality, the commodity shows itself, in the exposition, taking by itself the form of the representative of the general social relation in the autonomously regulated human metabolism process; and, consequently, affirming itself, by itself, as such a relation.

The circulation of commodities is the realization of this relation. It opens, as such, a new expository node. But the circulation of commodities does not carry out this opening presenting itself directly as renewed form, but from this one's pure externality: "commodities cannot go to the market by themselves". The exposition of the circulation of commodities continues with the analysis of the functions of money that appear, looked at in this way, as conditions for this circulation: measure of value and standard of price. It is just then that the very form of the circulation of commodities comes to life in the exposition, developing the functions of money, no longer as its premises, but as its necessary concrete forms. Money reaches, by this road, the concrete forms where commodity production has as its immediate object the production of the general social relation: money as hoard, means of payment and world money. The necessity of the production of the general social relation as the very aim and end of commodity production, externally made visible upon facing the circulation process in its abstract immediateness, shows itself now in the exposition, no longer as a generic necessity of money, but

as an inherent necessity for the concrete functions of money. Marx places us, thus, at the threshold of the finished form of the production of value: the production of value by means of value itself, the valorization of value. But the exposition goes beyond this threshold in a form that is not directly manifested, placing itself in the immediate exteriority of the valorization of value. It goes without saying, the exposition opens a new formal node here, facing the simplest manifestation of the circuit of capital [26].

[26] This particular modality of structuring the exposition incites the critical reader, who as such reproduces with his/her own thought the unfolding of the necessity of the subject which *Capital* deals with, to follow on his/her own account the internal movement that encloses the expository leaping-forward, critically developing the real necessity present there. With quite a different purpose, those who have their own historical reason to exist in the reactionary necessity of capital to make the ideal reproduction of present social forms pass off as an ideological way of conceiving these forms, find a foothold in this expository modality. Here, it is not about, by any means, the self-discovery of any real necessity at all. In fact, it is about managing not to see in this particular modality of structuring the exposition anything else but an opportunity to make Marx himself appear as the champion of the unavoidableness of the ideal representation of reality and, therefore, of the degradation of all necessity immanent to this reality itself, to nothingness. In order to do this, there is nothing more needed, and certainly nothing less, than to appeal to the doubly uncritical manipulation (equally concerning the expository modality upon which it has been based and the self-complacency of this very manipulation) of immediate appearance until it is made to say what is wanted. We find ourselves, thus, with the dialectical method of research ideologically represented as the analytical discovering that is exhausted in the fullness of its reach by only advancing over the immediately more abstract forms than the one in question each time, so as to place, from there, in an external, a logical relation, the discovered elements. This modern emulation of Procrustes is even frequently done under the protection of the ritual invocation to Marx's remark about the formal difference between the method of exposition and the method of research (ritual invocation, as it does not awake the least critical or self-critical hint with respect to the contents of the difference that is quoted); after all, who cares, if the only objective of this invocation is to shine the *Marxist* badge that is flaunted in the ideological little world, where being uncritical is a condition for admission. Here it is worth pointing out Rubin's skill to cultivate, with all the subtleness that this procedure allows, the

The mediation of the author's capacity to express the results of

appearance of having ideally unfolded the real necessity inherent to the commodity as simply such, precisely at the point where he has annihilated this unfolding. Rubin starts by invoking the analysis exposed by Marx concerning a real form that is commodity's own. But, as soon as that analysis uncovers the necessity immediately enclosed in this real form, the exposition leaps towards the invocation of the analytical consideration of another real form of the commodity. Sometimes Rubin takes this leap towards the analysis of the more abstract form pointed out by Marx as contained inside the one previously considered; at other times, towards the analysis of the form in which the one originally taken under consideration has already realized its necessity. Thus, he continues until completing the expository coverage of the different moments of the discovering of the real necessity in play. From being exposed as immediately analytical ones by Marx, these moments are represented now as absolutely immediately analytical, by the sole omission of the unfolding of the respective necessity. And, undoubtedly, what could the alteration of the sequence according to which the discoveries in question are originally presented matter, to whom does not see here the unfolding of necessity other than the one concerning the completeness of the expository coverage. With the enough uncritical dose, it can be believed like this that, having resorted in an abstractly formal way to the analysis exposed by Marx, his research method has been strictly followed. And, consequently, that the integrity of the ideal reproduction of the commodity's specific necessity, of the value-form of the product of human-labour, exposed in *Capital*, naturally takes shape in the flowing of the exposition from one *topic* to the next until exhausting the merely analytical completeness of the *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value*; essays from where all movement of the real necessity has been expurgated. "It is, in fact, much easier to find by analysis the earthly core of religious mistiness than, conversely, from the real relations of life at each moment, to develop their celestial forms. The latter is the only materialistic and, therefore, scientific method." "Es ist in der Tat viel leichter, durch Analyse den irdischen Kern der religiösen Nebelbildungen zu finden, als umgekehrt, aus den jedesmaligen wirklichen Lebensverhältnissen ihre verhimmelten Formen zu entwickeln. Die letztre ist die einzig materialistische und daher wissenschaftliche Methode." Marx, Karl *Das Kapital, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 331. Nevertheless, in this art of destroying the development of the necessity of the commodity under the appearance of faithfully reproducing Marx's exposition, the *Textbooks of Political Economy* from the USSR Academy of Science are self-sufficient to make Rubin appear as the model of virtues on expository substantiality. In these textbooks, the development of the real necessity that arises from

his/her research, always could leave room for the improving of the formal quality of the exposition of the ideal reproduction of reality already belonging to social cognition. And, concerning such reproduction, any difference in quality has no way to go beyond this same formality.

4. The ideal reproduction of reality concisely seen in its concrete unity

Let us stop for a moment to look at the course that we have followed up to the point where we reach the concrete forms of

the commodity itself appears substituted by such a monotonous as pretentiously pedagogic expository order, completely external to the necessity in question. From being a subject, the commodity ends up reduced, thus, to a *theme*. So that the content of the textbook can uncritically be learned and repeated until boredom, with no need -nor chance, as long as it is accepted to remain its prisoner- of understanding a single word of what it is said; which is, after all, the reason for being of any self-respecting economics textbook. Only the achievement of this ideological aim can give place to say with absolute freshness that "The labour of the producers of commodities, conceived of as investment of their human labour power in general, independently from the concrete form that it takes on, is the *abstract labour*", to add two paragraphs later that "Abstract labour, that forms the value of commodities, is a historical category, a specific form of social labour, only inherent to a commodity based economy." (USSR Academy of Science, *Manual de Economía Política*, Editorial Fundamentos, Buenos Aires, 1962, pp. 57 y 58. "El trabajo de los productores de mercancías, concebido como inversión de su fuerza humana de trabajo en general, independientemente de la forma concreta que revista, es el trabajo abstracto", "El trabajo abstracto, que forma el valor de la mercancía, es una categoría histórica, una forma específica del trabajo social, inherente tan sólo a la economía mercantil"). The intention of concealing the condition of being capital's personification thanks to overlooking the historical character inherent in the value-form of the products of labour, can hardly find a more grotesque stratagem than this one: to caricature Marx's exposition until making appear, as emerging from it, the obvious absurdity of attributing such historical character to the substance represented in this form, the materialized abstract-labour, the plain consumption of human labour-power crystallized in its product.

dialectical cognition. We immediately notice that we have ideally reproduced three times, in essence, one and the same real necessity. The first time, as this necessity presents itself to us when we started developing, with no further ado, our concrete action. That is to say, upon realizing our process of appropriation of matter. Here, it is about the advance of the immediate subject, ourselves, on its object, matter. And, therefore, it is about a necessity inherent to our action itself; the necessity that abstractly is this action's own one. The exposition correspondingly takes shape accompanying the development of our action, insofar as this action is realized under its particular form of process of the ideal appropriation of its own necessity. But this very process shows itself to us negating itself in its immediateness, to affirm itself as necessary concrete form of existence of matter. Matter makes itself evident, thus, as the true subject; our action, as matter's own specific movement. The exposition accompanies, then, this second unfolding of the necessity of our action, following the development of the necessity of matter as a concrete subject. As development (becoming) that determines its own necessity as possibility's concrete form of realizing itself, our conscious action manifests itself negating itself, in its turn, as a simple object of determination. It does so, by affirming itself, already under its specific form of human action regulated by means of the ideal reproduction of reality, as that concrete subject -matter- in its most developed form. A concrete subject that, in what it concerns here, embodies itself in the proceeding itself of that reproduction; that is, as dialectical method of cognition. It is as specific necessity of this concrete subject that the necessity of our action unfolds itself for the third time; and as such it starts reflecting itself in the exposition. The negation of the negation, dialectical method is the generic base of our point of departure; i.e., of the transforming action that regulates itself by means of the cognition of its own necessity, through ideally reproducing this necessity in an integral way. This cognition shows itself, now, in the very form of its method, excluding all appearance of exteriority between itself and the action that it sustains. It shows itself, therefore, as what it is: the regulation of such action; that is to say, a specific portion of this action and, consequently, this

action itself[27].

To state the obvious, society is the concrete form of matter that has conscious regulation of the social metabolism process as its own specific necessity. Society is, then, the concrete subject of this regulation. But society has no other form of materializing this, its own necessity, either than in individual ideal and, in a narrow sense, real appropriation. In its true nature as concrete form of social relations, the conscious regulation of the social metabolism process under the form of ideal reproduction of reality -i.e., dialectical cognition- is necessarily a task of the collective labourer cut off by the execution of the transformation of its medium on the basis of this regulation itself. This collective labourer only affirms itself in its unity as such with respect to the process of virtual appropriation of reality in itself, in the development, by each of its members, of at least, the whole reproduction of the necessity of the portion of the collective action that, as such member, it is for him/her to realize. Consequently, In the interior of this collective labourer there is room for the differentiation between the partial moments in which the regulation and, in the strict sense, realization of the action unfolds itself. But, the separation between the regulation and, in the strict sense, realization of each of those partial moments, has no way of finding room in this interior; i.e., the separation between the cognition of the necessity of the action and the execution of the action itself. All of the specific determinations of the directive-labour are reduced here, to that which emerges from the cognition of the concrete forms of the necessity that is going to be personified, in the part that this necessity specifically involves the

27 "The question if it is possible to attribute an objective truth to human thought is not a question of theory but a *practical* question. Human beings must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and the potency, the worldliness of their thought, in practice. The controversy about the reality or unreality of thought -thought which is isolated from practice- is a purely *scholastic* matter" Marx, Karl, 2nd thesis on Feuerbach. "Die Frage, ob dem menschlichen Denken gegenständliche Wahrheit zukomme - ist keine Frage der Theorie, sondern eine *praktische* Frage. In der Praxis muß der Mensch die Wahrheit, i.e. Wirklichkeit und Macht, Diesseitigkeit seines Denkens beweisen. Der Streit über die Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit des Denkens -das von der Praxis isoliert ist- ist eine rein *scholastische* Frage." *Thesen* ..., op. cit., p. 196.

coordination of the collective labourer in which the individual labourer participates. At the same time, the development of the necessity of her/his own individual action in full cognition of cause by the coordinated individual labourer carries in itself, by itself, the ideal reproduction of the necessity of the coordination of such action; and, therefore, the ideal reproduction of the necessity of the action of the coordinator her/himself. The direction of action excludes from itself, then, being supported by the monopoly of the cognition of the necessity to be incarnated by those who directly act, by those whose direction is exercised. And, moreover, this direction has no way to realize itself other than the consciousness of the necessity of their own action by these direct actors themselves. In other words, what truly happens is that directive-labour loses, under these conditions, its historical reason of being such directive labour, and, therefore, its very existence. Nothing remains for it but the simple coordination of the collective labourer that has, in the individuality of the members that together form it, the cognition of its own necessity. To put it concisely, the action regulated under the form of dialectical cognition is the abolition of the separation between intellectual-labour and manual-labour. The regulation of action by means of the ideal reproduction of reality, dialectical cognition, is, for the time being, necessary concrete form of capital. In its turn, capital is the very negation of the social metabolism process consciously regulated. Nevertheless, because of the very form of its process, dialectical cognition carries in itself as its own necessity, that necessity inherent to the social metabolism process consciously regulated: to be the product of the freely associated individuals. In the development of the form of its process determining the necessary form of the social subject capable of realizing it, dialectical cognition makes evident, hence, by its sole form, that it only is capital's potency insofar as this one has the annihilation of itself by means of the development of the material conditions of the aforementioned conscious regulation, as its historical necessity[28].

[28] In its historical development towards being the general form of regulation of the social metabolism process, that is to say, in its necessary development from capitalism's concrete form to socialism's concrete form, dialectical cognition lives together, as we well know, with the

Well then, there will surely be someone who thinks they see in what was exposed a little more than a reasonable course, tending to be obvious nowadays, for the developing of scientific cognition. Undoubtedly, the one who sticks to solid theoretical foundations will not fall into such an enormous confusion. Without going any further, how may he/she consider reasonably scientific, regardless of what the range of vision that he/she takes pride in having might be, a cognition that has shown not to carry in itself, not even the development of a theory of cognition. Nor,

regulation of action on the basis of the ideal representation of reality. And it certainly does so, up to the point that the collective labourer that personifies that regulation constantly sees itself faced with the necessity of defining the integration of its concrete action with the one of the collective labourer that personifies this other regulation. Where this integration takes place, a differentiation within the collective labourer consequently conformed is produced. We have not yet unfolded the concrete historical determinations of the development of consciousness in capitalism. Hence, here it is only suitable for us to point out the necessity of the portion of the collective labourer which regulates its action by means of the ideal reproduction of reality, to account for the necessity of the other portion of this labourer, that leads this portion to act with a cognition of cause limited to apparent concatenations (with which, the first portion takes the place of alienated consciousness of the second one). And, above all, we should point out the necessity of the first portion, our necessity, to cognize the self-necessity that gives reason for the unitary action together with the part of the collective labourer whose consciousness is limited to appearances. It is opportune to add, for the moment, that if in its immediateness the aforementioned association is a necessary form to potentiate the scope of the action of the portion of the fully conscious collective labourer, this association equally is, in itself, an expression of the limit to the potency able to be reached by the collective labourer in its unity, that arises from the historically determined presence of its portion with a limited consciousness. It is from here that the first portion of the collective labourer carries in itself, as a condition to the development of its own potency, the necessity of advancing in the transformation of the second portion in one of its same species. Despite the reactionary fantasies whose only cleverness lies in projecting the filth of the alienated consciousness that is natural to capitalism, to a social regulation whose realization not only is the pulverization of all alienated consciousness, but has this pulverization as a material condition of existence.

rather, the development of any theory at all. And that, consequently, faces as an alien limit the verifiable, falsifiable or heuristic nature of theories; i.e., the in itself insoluble external dialectic between theory and practice[29]. Definitely, the scientific cognition that theoretically represents to itself the real forms, theoretical cognition, finds itself completely under cover of shearing the illusion we are referring to. To this form of scientific cognition, that dominates the world scene in an absolute way at present, the ideal reproduction of reality cannot be anything else but a string of inadmissible lucubrations. Alien to all logic, it would say; and, unquestionably, in this affirmation it would not be so far from the truth: if something has shown itself absent from that ideal reproduction up to now, that is, precisely, logic.

[29] This apparent dialectic stems from the nature of the historical stage of humanity's development in which the regulation of the social metabolism process by means of thought, i.e., the specifically human regulation of the social metabolism process, is alienated by turning into a concrete form of the autonomous regulation of this process by the production of value. Only in this historical stage can scientific cognition appear to be denying its true immediate condition of the necessary form of regulation of conscious action. Moreover, scientific cognition can even appear as the very denying of action, as its abstract opposite; that is to say, as theoretical cognition.

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Impreso en noviembre de 1992
en Talleres Gráficos Su Impres
Tucumán 1490, Buenos Aires

Dialectical Cognition

The Regulation of Action in its Form of Reproduction of Self-Necessity by thought

Juan Iñigo Carrera

The formulation of theories appears nowadays as the natural form of scientific cognition. But scientific theory itself has already arrived at the logically unavoidable conclusion that it is impossible to demonstrate the truth or falsity of theories prior to action. Therefore, scientific theories are only ways of *interpreting* the world and, as such, the very negation of conscious action, of the action that carries in itself the cognition of its own necessity. Socialism is the consciously, thus scientifically, regulated human social metabolism process. As much as scientific cognition is condemned to interpretation, so is socialism condemned to impossibility.

The question of the development of scientific cognition truly is, today, the question of the development of capital*capital*. And, therefore, about the development of the organicity itself of this action, about the development of scientific cognition as necessary concrete form of radical political action.

It is not scientific cognition that faces the end of its history. It is rather *scientific theory*, the historical specific form of that cognition when it is alienated potency in the human social metabolism process autonomously regulated by means of the valorization of value, i.e., in capitalism. The critique of the current universally dominating science does not take shape in the construction of a new theory, but in the overcoming of scientific theory itself. Thus, it is not about conceiving a new *representation of reality*, condemned by its sole condition of representation to follow a constructive necessity alien to the real necessity, i.e., a *logic*. The point is *to virtually appropriate reality by reproducing its necessity through thought*, the *ideal reproduction of reality*. Hence, the development of scientific cognition as regulation of the transformation of our present society into the one of freely associated individuals is the *critique of scientific theory*.

In the very form of its method, that is, as *dialectical cognition*, the reproduction of real self-necessity by means of thought immediately shows itself excluding all appearance of externality in relation to the action that it sustains. It shows itself, therefore, as what it is: the regulation of such action; that is to say, a specific portion of this action and, consequently, this action itself. Scientific research thus overcomes all appearance of being the abstract opposite of practice, to affirm itself as *practical criticism*. The unfolding of the forms of dialectical cognition insofar as they are specifically such already suffices by itself as a spearhead for the necessarily collective work in which the ideal reproduction of our real necessity takes shape; at the present time, the regulation with cognition of the cause of the radical transformation of society.

CENTRO para la INVESTIGACION como CRITICA PRACTICA
(CENTER for RESEARCH as PRACTICAL CRITICISM)

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ISBN 950-798-000-9